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Abstract 
Interconnectors reduce the cost of electricity supply if they are operated efficiently. 
We show that established metrics used to monitor electricity trading inefficiency 
become increasingly inaccurate in several trading conditions. We devise the 
Unweighted and Price-Weighted Inefficient Interconnector Utilisation indices to 
address these deficiencies. These metrics are substantially more accurate than 
existing ones and perform equally well whether or not markets are coupled. Our 
results show a substantial decrease in inefficient trading between Great Britain and 
both France and the Netherlands after the European Union’s market coupling 
regulations were introduced in 2014. 
In view of Great Britain’s likely withdrawal from the European Union, the paper also 
evaluates how market uncoupling would affect cross-border trade. We find that 
uncoupling would lead to inefficiencies in trade, the electricity price differential 
between GB and France (Netherlands) rising by 3% (2%), net imports into GB 
decreasing by 26% (13%), congestion income decreasing by 10% (5%), and infra-
marginal surplus decreasing by 1.6% (1.6%) of coupled congestion income. We also 
show that, should the EU decide to implement an equivalent carbon tax to GB’s 
Carbon Price Floor, uncoupling impacts would be slightly magnified due to electricity 
prices converging (by about 1% of coupled congestion income). 
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ABSTRACT 
Interconnectors reduce the cost of electricity supply if they are operated efficiently. We show 
that established metrics used to monitor electricity trading inefficiency become increasingly 
inaccurate in several trading conditions. We devise the Unweighted and Price-Weighted 
Inefficient Interconnector Utilisation indices to address these deficiencies. These metrics are 
substantially more accurate than existing ones and perform equally well whether or not 
markets are coupled. Our results show a substantial decrease in inefficient trading between 
Great Britain and both France and the Netherlands after the European Union’s market 
coupling regulations were introduced in 2014. 
In view of Great Britain’s likely withdrawal from the European Union, the paper also evaluates 
how market uncoupling would affect cross-border trade. We find that uncoupling would lead 
to inefficiencies in trade, the electricity price differential between GB and France (Netherlands) 
rising by 3% (2%), net imports into GB decreasing by 26% (13%), congestion income 
decreasing by 10% (5%), and infra-marginal surplus decreasing by 1.6% (1.6%) of coupled 
congestion income. We also show that, should the EU decide to implement an equivalent 
carbon tax to GB’s Carbon Price Floor, uncoupling impacts would be slightly magnified due to 
electricity prices converging (by about 1% of coupled congestion income). 
KEYWORDS 
Electricity trading efficiency; cross-border allocation; interconnector; market coupling; metrics. 
HIGHLIGHTS 
1. Measures of electricity trading inefficiency are reviewed and classified 
2. New measures that are robust to market conditions are devised 
3. The new measures are quantitatively assessed against existing measures 
4. EU market coupling regulations have largely reduced trading inefficiency 
5. The potential economic loss from market uncoupling is substantial 
ABBREVIATIONS 
4MMC  4M Market Coupling 
ACER   Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
CWE  Central Western Europe 
DA  Day-ahead 
EUPHEMIA Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration Algorithm 
FAPD  Flow against price differential 
FBMC  Flow Based Market Coupling 
FWPD  Flow with price differential 
IEM  Integrated Energy Market  
MRC  Multi Region Coupling 
NTC  Net transfer capacity 
PCR  Price Coupling of Regions 
QREEM Quarterly Report on European Electricity Markets
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1 Introduction 
Interconnectors create value by enabling electricity imports from markets with lower prices as 
an alternative to higher-priced indigenous generation. This reduces the overall cost of 
supplying electricity across the two systems and would be expected to reduce consumer 
prices in the importing country and increase consumer welfare there. In the future, 
interconnectors could become increasingly valuable as electricity generation becomes more 
variable due to higher renewable generation. In response, countries are investing extensively 
in interconnectors. Imports might be expected primarily during periods of high residual demand, 
while exporting surplus renewable electricity helps avoid curtailment. 
While interconnectors have been used in Europe for decades, the EU’s Integrated Electricity 
Market (IEM) was established in 2014 to allow electricity to be traded freely between member 
states, with markets coupled to improve the economic efficiency of the interconnector flows 
(ACER, 2015). This means that all coupled markets are cleared simultaneously with 
transmission capacity allocated so that electricity flows from lower to higher priced zones until 
either prices equalise or interconnector capacity is fully used (ACER, 2017). By 2019, 23 
European countries had coupled markets, 1 with algorithms used to ensure that the total 
consumer and producer surplus is maximised. This has led to more efficient coordination of 
trading over multiple electricity systems, and substantial welfare gains (Newbery et al., 2016). 
Welfare gains2 between markets depend on the price differential between the two connected 
markets as well as the efficiency of electricity trading (Ochoa and van Ackere, 2015). 
In this paper, we systematically evaluate various metrics of day-ahead trading inefficiency for 
the first time. Based on this analysis, two new measures of trading inefficiency are proposed, 
and evaluated against existing metrics using a series of trading patterns and historical trading 
data. Historical measures of trading inefficiency do not incorporate valuable information about 
direction of flows or transfer capacity, so we devise new measures that improve on existing 
ones. 
We also explore the potential economic losses of market uncoupling, investigating its impact 
on net electricity imports, price differentials, trading inefficiency, and the private and social 
value of the interconnectors to France and The Netherlands. The UK’s foreseen withdrawal 
from the European Union is expected to result in Great Britain uncoupling from Continental 
electricity markets, with cross-border markets set to operate at different times. Understanding 
the impact of market uncoupling on the efficiency of cross-border trade is required to design 
policies that minimise likely welfare losses. This analysis will allow us to evaluate the reduction 
in efficiency from post-Brexit market uncoupling and provide valuable insights on the potential 
impact of uncoupling on cross-border trade.   
The paper: 
1. classifies the current measures of day-ahead trading inefficiency; 
2. reviews the literature on trading inefficiencies and related measures; 
3. devises new measures of inefficiency that improve over existing ones; 
4. quantitatively assesses these new measures against existing measures; and 
5. assesses the potential economic losses from market uncoupling. 
 
1 Nineteen via Multi Regional Coupling (MRC) and four via 4M Market Coupling (4MMC) covering the Czech-
Slovak-Hungarian-Romanian market areas. 
2 For more information about approaches to estimating welfare gains, including a summary of advantages and 
disadvantages is given in Appendix G.1  
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2 Electricity trading via interconnectors 
Most EU and EEA interconnectors offer capacity in forward and day-ahead auctions. These 
allow traders the opportunity to profit from differences in electricity prices between connected 
markets. It also allows traders the opportunity to hedge existing physical positions. For 
example, a trader who purchased electricity in France and sold electricity in Great Britain can 
forward-buy interconnector capacity from France to Great Britain, to hedge unexpected 
uncertainty from day-ahead price differentials.  
Day-ahead capacity is nominated and scheduled at around midday on the day prior to delivery. 
Traders subsequently have an opportunity to buy and nominate capacity in the intra-day 
market typically until a few hours before flow. The intra-day nomination can increase, reduce 
or even reverse the day-ahead scheduled flow. For this reason, if 1,500 MW of the 2,000 MW 
capacity from France to Great Britain has been scheduled, it is possible in the intra-day market 
to nominate an additional 500 MW from France to Great Britain, or to nominate as much as 
3,500 MW from Great Britain to France.  
Nominated flow positions are netted against physical purchases and sales in the individual 
markets. These products can be entered into in bilateral forward markets, on day-ahead 
exchanges, or intra-day either bilaterally or on exchanges. A trader's net position in each 
market is settled via balancing mechanisms, which can be highly volatile, hence most traders 
will seek to ensure they are balanced in each market before the delivery period. 
2.1 Market coupling 
Historically, national electricity markets were “uncoupled”, which meant interconnector 
capacity scheduling and purchasing/selling electricity in each market took place separately. 
Trading in uncoupled markets leads to inefficient outcomes characterised by a proportion of 
electricity flows from higher to lower priced regions, known as Flows Against the Price 
Differential (FAPD) (ACER, 2012). These are caused by information asymmetry, for example 
from markets closing at different times. 
To avoid this, a number of European day-ahead markets introduced coupling in 2014 using a 
shared algorithm known as EUPHEMIA (ACER, 2017). EUPHEMIA uses bids and offers for 
electricity in each market, along with interconnector constraints, and generates optimal flows. 
Under this algorithm, interconnector flows will be directed from low to high price regions, until 
either the price differential is eliminated or the interconnector reaches full capacity. Day-ahead 
markets are now coupled across continental Europe, while the British-Irish interconnectors 
were coupled in October 2018. Intra-day coupling became available in 2018 for some 
European markets (although not for the GB market), while balancing market coupling is still at 
an early stage in Europe (ACER, 2017). A description of trading in coupled and uncoupled 
electricity markets is provided in Appendix F2. 
2.2 Benefits of reducing trading inefficiency through market coupling 
Inefficient use of interconnector capacity implies a missed opportunity to increase total welfare 
by buying electricity in the lower-priced market, flowing and selling in the higher-priced market. 
The size of the gains from coupling is more challenging to estimate, as it depends on estimates 
of the frequency and impact of suboptimal flow, which change over time. Moreover, the gains 
reduce with additional interconnector capacity, but increase with more variable generation. 
Newbery et al. (2016) estimated the potential benefit to the EU of coupling interconnectors to 
increase the efficiency of trading day-ahead, intra-day and sharing balancing services 
efficiently across borders. They find that further gains are possible by eliminating unscheduled 
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flows and avoiding the curtailment of renewables, with short-run gains potentially as high as 
€3.3bn/yr more than the then current gains from trade. The authors also find that one-third of 
these benefits comes from day-ahead coupling and another third from shared balancing. 
Newbery et al. (2013) reviewed the literature on the quantitative benefits of market integration. 
More recent evidence surveyed by Pollitt (2018) concludes that measurable benefits of the 
Integrated Electricity Market are likely to be small in total in part because there has been a 
large rise in subsidised renewable generation that has not been efficiently allocated across 
member states. 
3 Measures of trading inefficiency 
This paper focuses on trading efficiency based on the day-ahead market. It considers metrics 
of cross-zonal capacity utilisation inefficiency, which are measures that determine how 
inefficiently transmission capacity is used over interconnectors linking two price zones. The 
economic inefficiency of interconnector flows is the percentage of interconnector capacity that 
is not allocated such that electricity flows from lower to higher priced zones until either prices 
in each zone equalise. If interconnector capacity is fully used and flows are in the efficient 
direction then the capacity is efficiently used. 
Analyses of trading efficiency in the different time frames (day-ahead and intra-day) involve 
several approaches and varying degrees of complexity. Metrics for trading inefficiency are 
categorised based on the data used by these measures and include: (i) price-based; (ii) flow-
based; and, (iii) price- and flow-based metrics. Detailed discussions of these metrics are 
provided in the next three subsections, and the associated studies is given in Table 1.  
Method Data  Report/Author Metric description/method 
Historical 
analysis 
Price 
ACER (2011) Percentage of hours when hourly day-ahead (DA) prices were equal. 
ACER (2012) Categorised (low, medium, high) DA price convergence.  
EU Commission (2012-
Q3) Weekly ratio of price convergence. 
EU Commission (2012-
Q2) Percentage of hours with price convergence below 1%. 
Flow 
ACER (2012) Indexed annual aggregation of hourly NTC values. 
ACER (2012) Capacity utilisation ratio. 
ACER (2017) Absolute sum of net nominations. 
Price 
and 
flow 
Montoya et al. (2019) Unweighted Inefficient Interconnector Utilisation (UIIU) – Eq.4* 
Montoya et al. (2019) Price-Weighted Inefficient Interconnector Utilisation (PWIIU) – Eq.5* 
ACER (2012) Percentage of hours with day-ahead nominations against price differentials. 
ACER (2018) Percentage of the available NTC used in the correct economic direction. 
ACER (2012) Loss in Social welfare. 
EU Commission (2010-
Q3) Unweighted Flows Against Price Differential (UFAPD, or FAPD). 
EU Commission (2010-
Q3) 
Split of flows against price difference by subcategory of pre-established 
intervals of price differentials. 
EU Commission (2010-
Q3) Monetary value of energy exchanged in inefficient flow regime. 
EU Commission (2010-
Q3) 
Sum of hourly values of absolute price differentials multiplied by net cross 
border flows. 
Newbery et al. (2019) Value Destruction. 
Newbery et al. (2019) Percentage of potential congestion revenue. 
Meeus (2011) Test on unused capacity times price differential. 
Simulation-
based 
analysis 
ACER (2011) 
Measures of social welfare.  De Jong et al. (2007) 
Newbery et al. (2016) 
Table 1. Classification of measurements used for measuring market coupling. The shaded area denotes 
measures of cross-zonal capacity utilisation efficiency. * indicates the present study. 
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To understand how existing metrics are affected under various market conditions, we consider 
possible combinations and magnitudes of price and flow differentials between pairs of markets. 
We focus on price-and-flow-based metrics because these are the most widely used and 
informative, since they employ more information on market allocations compared to metrics 
based on prices alone or flows alone. We describe in more detail the most commonly used 
metrics, including FAPD and related metrics of economic inefficiency. (A full description of 
price-based metrics and flow-based metrics, including their advantages and disadvantages, 
is provided in Appendix F.3.)  
Price-based metrics mainly include mean or median price differentials and econometric 
methods to assess prices, including correlation and co-integration analyses (Castagneto 
Gissey et al., 2014; ACER, 2015, 2017). Flow-based metrics include: Indexed annual 
aggregation of hourly NTC values; Capacity utilisation ratio; and Absolute sum of net 
nominations per year (ACER, 2012; 2018). Here we focus on price-and-flow based metrics, 
which include more information about trades and are most commonly used for policy. 
3.1 Price-and-flow-based metrics 
Flows Against the Price Differential (FAPD). This measures the number of times in which 
electricity flows from lower to higher priced zones (EU Commission, 2010). In any time period, 
the FAPD, is the total number of inefficient imports (and exports) 𝑁𝑁− divided by the total 
number of flows N and is defined by the following metric:  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝐼𝐼1 = 𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁  . (1) 
 
Since the magnitude of the price differential is not reflected in the FAPD, we refer to this as 
the Unweighted FAPD or UFAPD in this paper. UFAPD values between 2% and 6% have 
been found by Newbery et al. (2016), representing the imperfect coupling in European day-
ahead markets over interconnectors between Germany, Denmark, Spain and France before 
2014. 
The simplicity of UFAPD is attractive due to its ease of implementation and interpretation. Yet 
it lacks information regarding the quantity of electricity traded unprofitably and the price 
differentials at which these trades occurred. For example, the 0.01% inefficient flows for 
Belgium-Netherlands lead to 53% of the potentially valuable trade being exchanged during 
inefficient flows (Figure 2). Hence judging the inefficiency of an interconnector utilisation based 
solely on UFAPD could be highly misleading. 
 
 
Figure 1. GB scheduled net imports vs price differentials on the IFA interconnector between GB and France 
before and after the 2014 implementation of the EUPHEMIA market coupling algorithm. For additional 
related graphs see also Appendix B.  
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Figure 1 shows the combinations of net scheduled imports and transmission loss-adjusted 
price differentials relating to trades over the IFA interconnector between GB and France in two 
years, before and after the 2014 coupling. The figure, which we refer to as the ‘S-curve’, 
presents the raw scheduled commercial exchanges, so it does not account for the possibility 
of unplanned outages or unscheduled maintenance. There are horizontal bands of 
observations at multiples of 500 MW because of periodic partial de-rating of one or more 
cables (IFA constitutes four 500-MW cables). Note the absence of costly imports and low-
priced exports in the coupled period, where electricity flowed in the efficient economic direction. 
In this case the S-curve suggests UFAPDs close to zero. 
The pre-2014 situation is quite different and clearly shows strong deviations from the perfect 
trading described earlier. There are persistent price differentials even with no capacity 
restrictions, which suggests that trading was not fully efficient, with numerous periods with 
electricity flowing in the wrong direction. Possible reasons for inefficient use were investigated 
by various authors (Bunn and Zachmann, 2010; Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2005; Geske et al., 
2018), and include: uncertainty from the separate energy and transmission markets; system 
operators being required to schedule cross-border flows for congestion and system balancing; 
and strategic trading by generators with market power. Here, the S-curve is highly dispersed, 
indicating severely inefficient trading. 
Weighted FAPD (WFAPD). The Weighted FAPD, WFAPD, (EU Commission, 2010) accounts 
for the monetary value of the uneconomic flows and is defined as: 
𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝐼𝐼2 =  ∑ �?̃?𝑓ℎ−∗𝑥𝑥ℎ−�𝑁𝑁−ℎ∑ �?̃?𝑓ℎ−∗𝑥𝑥ℎ−�+∑ �?̃?𝑓ℎ+∗𝑥𝑥ℎ+�𝑁𝑁+ℎ𝑁𝑁−ℎ , (2) 
 
where – and + denote ‘wrong’ (inefficient) and ‘correct’ (efficient) direction; 𝑓𝑓 are flows during 
hour ℎ at a corresponding spread of 𝑥𝑥, or price differential; and |𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑥𝑥| is the absolute value of 
𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑥𝑥. The EU Commission (2010) denotes “welfare loss” and “mark-up” as the numerator and 
denominator respectively. Figure 2 shows the inefficient flows for the Belgian-Dutch and 
Austrian-Italian markets, with the numbers in brackets indicating (in order) the Unweighted 
FAPD and Weighted FAPD, illustrating the differences between the metrics. 
 
Figure 2. Chart of inefficient flows for the Belgian-Dutch and Austrian-Italian markets. Numbers in brackets 
indicate Unweighted FAPD (FAPD) and Weighted FAPD (WFAPD). Source: European Commission (2011-
Q1). 
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The 53% value calculated using the WFAPD metric improves on this by addressing these two 
shortcomings but still fails to offer a complete and reliable description of interconnector 
inefficiency because it does not take account of the Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) actually 
available. In addition, during periods without inefficient flows, both measures indicate zero 
inefficiency so do not account for any inefficiencies resulting from underutilised NTC during 
efficient import or export periods. That is, if all flows were Flows With the Price Differentials 
(FWPD), it would not adjust accordingly in the case where, for example, only 50% or 25% of 
the available capacity was utilised when price differences remained. 
Share of capacity used in the correct economic direction (SCURED). Another measure 
of market coupling derives the share of capacity used in the correct economic direction and is 
illustrated in Figure 3. We reproduce this metric from ACER (2018) as:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹∗ = 𝐼𝐼3∗ = ∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥(ℎ)>𝑘𝑘+𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁+ℎ∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥(ℎ)>𝑘𝑘+𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁+ℎ . (3) 
 
Here 𝑁𝑁+ represents the number of hourly (ℎ) nominations (𝑀𝑀) that occurred across a given 
border (𝐵𝐵) in the efficient economic direction (+) with the available capacity(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆); 𝑘𝑘 denotes 
a threshold (normally set to €1/MWh) to represent the level below which price differential (𝑥𝑥)  
observations are excluded from the calculation. ACER (2018) uses this to derive the share of 
capacity used in the efficient direction relative to the price differential.  
The advantage of SCURED is that it indicates how much of the capacity is used to flow 
electricity associated with a favourable price differential, but like UFAPD it lacks information 
about the price differential at which these flows occurred.3 Another shortcoming is that the 
presence of flows against the price differential does not impact the metric at all and, as such, 
its accuracy diminishes as the number of inefficient flows increases.  
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of NTC used in the correct economic direction for a selection of EU borders in 2011. 
Note that this was prior to coupling through EUPHEMIA. Source: ACER (2012). 
 
3 Apart from these having occurred above the predetermined significant price differential threshold.  
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Inefficiency based on nominal capacity. If prices are materially different, interconnector 
capacity should be fully used, while it should be underused only if prices are essentially the 
same. This metric indicates the percentage of potential congestion revenue. For example, the 
BritNed interconnector has a capacity of 1,000 MW. From 2015–18 this measure of efficiency 
is 95% (€12,276/hr vs €13,378/hr), yielding €107 million/yr (Newbery et al., 2019), assuming 
the interconnector is available at full capacity throughout each year. This is equivalent to 5% 
inefficiency. Its main advantage is that it is simple to estimate given the day-ahead market 
prices in each country and the nominal capacity of the interconnector, but its drawback is that 
full capacity may not be available for technical or other reasons, and so overstates what could 
actually be earned. 
Value destruction. This is calculated as the physical flow times the price differential for flows 
against the price differential (FAPDs), indicating the amount of value that could have been 
generated by the interconnector but was not due to inefficient flows. Newbery et al. (2019) 
compute value destruction on the IFA interconnector before the 2014 coupling of GB and 
France. Value destruction in 2013 was 14% of the total value of €231m/yr at €31.9m/yr.  
Several studies have calculated social welfare, but these can hardly be considered metrics as 
they typically depend on models of the underlying electricity system. With numerous 
assumptions varying across models and studies, this makes comparisons difficult. More 
information about measures of social welfare is given in Appendix F.4. 
3.2 Defining an ideal metric for interconnector trading efficiency 
The ideal metric should provide the highest degree of accuracy irrespectively of whether two 
markets are coupled or not. To ensure transparency, it should use information that is readily 
available to the public and not rely on proprietary data, which would restrict use. The 
underlying algorithm should ideally be simple to implement with commonly used software. 
These properties ensure reproducibility and auditability, but generally exclude the use of 
models.  
As interconnectors have different capacities, the metric should facilitate comparisons of trade 
inefficiency, so absolute valued metrics (whether in currency or energy units) would make this 
difficult. An index ranging, for example, between 0% and 100% is easier to interpret. 
3.3 Interconnector utilisation inefficiency metrics 
We have developed two new metrics that uniquely include information not only on the direction 
of flows (both efficient and inefficient) and the price differential level, but also on the 
percentage of net transfer capacity used during the cross-zonal exchange. Our new metrics 
similarly have values ranging from zero to unity.  
Considering a sample size N, of hourly price differential and flow combinations, we define the 
Unweighted Inefficient Interconnector Utilisation4 (UIIU) metric as: 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 = 𝐼𝐼4 = �𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁 �� 1𝑁𝑁−�� (1 + |𝑓𝑓ℎ−|)2𝑁𝑁−
ℎ
+ �𝑁𝑁+
𝑁𝑁
��
1
𝑁𝑁+
��
(1 − |𝑓𝑓ℎ+|)1𝑁𝑁+
ℎ+ �𝑁𝑁0
𝑁𝑁
��
1
𝑁𝑁0
��
�1 − �𝑓𝑓ℎ0��1𝑁𝑁0
ℎ
 
 
 
(4) 
 
4 A detailed derivation can be found in the Appendix A. A simplistic interpretation of Equation (1) is the average 
flow-distance from the S-curve weighted by the proportion of FAPDs (or FWPDs) observed in the corresponding 
(efficient or inefficient) region. 
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where 
𝑁𝑁 = 𝑁𝑁− + 𝑁𝑁+ + 𝑁𝑁0
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓− + 𝑓𝑓+ + 𝑓𝑓0|𝑓𝑓| = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓                                                                   𝑓𝑓ℎ = 𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆ℎ 
with the superscripts ‘-‘, ‘+’, and ‘0’5, denoting inefficient-flow6, efficient-flow and no-flow,7 
respectively. NTC stands for Net Transfer Capacity, while 𝑓𝑓ℎ is the hourly flow. UIUU is an 
index of trading inefficiency ranging from 0 to 1, with a value of 0 indicating no inefficiency (or 
100% efficiency), and a value of 1 indicating maximum inefficiency (0% efficiency). This means 
that the level of efficiency can be extrapolated by simply subtracting the index from 1.  
Consider two inefficient flows occurring at distinct price differentials: inefficient flow #1 occurs 
at 900 MW, at a price differential of €200/MWh; and inefficient flow #2 occurs at 900 MW, but 
at a €2/MWh price differential. Everything else being equal, inefficient flow #1 should be more 
inefficient than inefficient flow #2 due to the larger congestion rent loss. As the flows in 
Equation 4 already adjust by NTC, we adjust further by the price differential dimension (in an 
analogous fashion as WFAPD adjusted UFAPD) leading to the Price-Weighted Inefficient 
Interconnector Utilisation (PWIIU) metric. 
𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 = 𝐼𝐼5 = �𝑤𝑤ℎ (1 + |𝑓𝑓ℎ−|)2𝑁𝑁−
ℎ
+ �𝑤𝑤ℎ(1− |𝑓𝑓ℎ+|)𝑁𝑁+
ℎ
+ �𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑁𝑁0
ℎ
 (5) 
where 
𝑤𝑤ℎ = |𝑥𝑥ℎ|∑|𝑥𝑥ℎ| 
and 𝑥𝑥 is the price differential. As UIIU is a measure between 0 and 1, we choose the weighting 
scheme 𝑤𝑤ℎ for PWIIU in such a way as to preserve these same bounds. Similarly, PWIIU is 
also an index ranging from 0 to 1, with a value of 0 indicating no inefficiency (or 100% 
efficiency), and a value of 1 indicating maximum inefficiency (0% efficiency).  
Equation 4 is deliberately specified8 to blend existing metrics (UFPAD and SCURED*) in the 
special case of dealing with only one border and when 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆ℎ is constant over the sampled 
period. We can summarise Equation 4 as: 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 = (𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)(𝜁𝜁) + �𝑁𝑁+
𝑁𝑁
� (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹∗) + �𝑁𝑁0
𝑁𝑁
�      (6) 
A Microsoft Excel formula is provided as an attachment to this paper to facilitate estimation. 
See Appendix C. 
 
5 By definition, fh0 = 0. 
6 An inefficient flow is one against the price differential (FAPD). 
7 A no-flow is the event of zero IC utilisation given that a non-zero price differential occurred. 
8 The denominators of 1 and 2 emphasise the maximal flow distance of any point from the S-curve, where the S-
curve is given by the price differential-flow combination e.g. in Figure 1, with flows divided by available capacity. 
The closer the combinations to the S-curve, the more efficient is interconnector trading. 
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4 Methodology 
We benchmark our metrics against UFAPD, WFAPD, and SCURED*9, as these are regularly 
used in official market reports (e.g. ACER, 2016; 2017; and EU Commission, 2015-Q1). First, 
we use a series of hypothetical trading scenarios, which represent extreme cases of 
interconnector utilisation, to test the robustness of the metrics. Second, we assess variations 
between metrics using historical data for the IFA interconnector between Great Britain and 
France for the years 2013 to 2018. 
4.1 Testing the inefficiency metrics 
4.1.1 Stress data 
We construct a total of eleven scenarios to represent extreme market conditions that can be 
experienced by coupled and uncoupled markets with the aim of stress-testing the metrics.10 
The scenarios are classified as follows: 
 Scenarios 1 to 4 span the combination of high price differentials (for both profitable 
and unprofitable flows) with varying interconnector efficiency utilisation; 
 Scenarios 5 and 6 represent periods of zero and 100% unprofitable flows. 
 Scenarios 7 and 8 represent a very low number of extreme price differentials in 
instances of profitable and unprofitable flows. 
 Scenario 9 contains only a single profitable flow at a low price differential that is 
captured at 90% of available NTC.   
 Scenarios 10 and 11 contain 100% profitable flows and differ in the degree to which 
the large price differentials are captured with interconnector use.  
These scenarios are graphed in Section 5.1.1. 
4.1.2 Historical data 
Historical data for the IFA and BritNed interconnectors covers the timeframe 1 Jan 2013 to 31 
Dec 2018 in order to include periods in which markets were coupled and uncoupled. 
Forecasted NTCs for the day-ahead market are available from the ENTSO-E Transparency 
Platform (TP) and are used as a proxy for NTC. Day-ahead GB prices are sourced from Nord 
Pool N2EX prices. French and Dutch power prices for the period 2013–2015 are from EPEX 
Spot; for 2015–2018 they are from the ENTSO-E TP. The flow data is the RTE (day-ahead) 
commercial forecast for IFA; for BritNed, scheduled commercial exchanges are from ENTSO-
E in the first period (2013-2014) and simulated11 in the second (2015-2018). In the calculations, 
we ignore samples where the price differential is equal to zero and cap12 the flow series by 
the corresponding NTC. Table 2 reports the data sources by time period.  
 
9 As SCURED* is an efficiency measure, we define SCURED = 1-SCURED* as the inefficiency measure. 
10 We assume a constant NTC of 2,000 MWh, which is equivalent to full capacity on the IFA interconnector. 
11 Due to data unavailability, we used the same simulation as Guo et al. (2019). 
12 If a flow of 1,665 MW occurred when NTC was only 1,500 MW, we reset the flow to 1,500 MW. 
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Data 2013–2015 2015–2018 
FR prices EPEX ENTSO-E 
NL prices EPEX ENTSO-E 
GB prices Nord Pool N2EX Nord Pool N2EX 
IFA flows RTE RTE 
BritNed flows ENTSO-E Simulated 
IFA NTC ENTSO-E ENTSO-E 
BritNed NTC ENTSO-E ENTSO-E 
Table 2. Data sources by time series and historical period. 
4.2 Econometric analysis of market coupling 
We use an econometric model for the purpose to define the annual average degree of 
utilisation inefficiency of the interconnectors between Great Britain and France (through IFA) 
between 2014 and 2019,13 as well as between Great Britain and the Netherlands (through 
BritNed) between 2015 and 2018,14 by assuming the presence or absence of market coupling.  
We simulate a situation, during the period 2014-2019, where GB is assumed uncoupled from 
France and the Netherlands and compare our results with actual data where markets are 
coupled. This will also allow us to obtain valuable insights on the potential economic impact of 
market uncoupling, and thereforehence on the potential impact of a no-deal Brexit on cross-
border trade. We investigate potential economic losses by considering how uncoupling is likely 
to impact net electricity imports, price differentials, trading inefficiency, and the private and 
social value of GB’s two main interconnectors in this period, IFA and BritNed. In this analysis, 
using the estimated parameters from Guo et al. (2019),15 we also simulate the cases where 
the GB Carbon Price Support (CPS) is removed. This will be useful to understand the impacts 
of market uncoupling in the case where Britain’s carbon tax, the Carbon Price Support, is 
abolished or extended to other EU countries. Details of the methodology used in this part of 
the paper are provided in Appendix D. 
5 Results of metrics testing 
5.1 Stress dataset 
Figures 4-6 show the different scenarios.  The first four scenarios are illustrated below, 
followed by Table 3, which summarises the performance of all scenarios under the different 
metrics. 
 
 
13 Electricity years run from 1 April to 31 March. 
14 Due to data availability issues, we use the simulated the day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange for BritNed 
from Guo et al. (2019).   
15 In particular, the partial effects of interconnector flows on the GB-FR(NL) price differential, and the partial effects 
of the CPS on the GB-FR(NL) price differential.  
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5.1.1 Scenarios 1–4 (Low number of inefficient flows) 
 
Figure 4. Scenarios 1–4: Low number of inefficient flows. 
Scenario N+ N- UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
1 699 45 6.1% 84.7% 85.7% 85.8% 86.6% 
2 699 45 6.1% 17.4% 4.8% 8.1% 32.7% 
3 699 45 6.1% 16.60% 76.2% 76.9% 76.5% 
4 699 45 6.1% 1.3% 4.8% 8.1% 6.7% 
5 744 0 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.1% 
6 0 744 100% 100% UND 97.6% 97.9% 
7 729 15 2.0% 69.6% 85.6% 85.6% 84.7% 
8 15 729 98.0% 30.4% 32.1% 56.7% 49.5% 
9 1 743 99.9% 99.9% 10% 97.5% 97.8% 
10 168 0 0.0% 0.0% 33.8% 33.8% 36.9% 
11 168 0 0.0% 0.0% 33.8% 33.8% 34.1% 
Table 3. Results using stress data for each of the metrics based on price differentials and flows. 
UND=Undefined. N+, N-, and N0 indicate flows in the correct economic direction, in the wrong economic 
direction, and no flows, respectively. 
These first four scenarios represent a range of low inefficient flow proportions combined with 
varying degrees of price differentials and NTC utilisation. As an absolute measure of efficiency, 
Table 3 demonstrates the inability of the UFAPD index to address an interconnector’s 
underutilisation of efficient flows in Scenario 3. UIIU and PWIIU consistently display a greater 
degree of inefficiency of interconnector utilisation compared to the SCURED index, which 
ignores inefficient flows. Both WFAPD and PWIIU correctly capture the subtlety in Scenario 2 
where, despite the rare appearances, inefficient flows occurred at very high price differentials. 
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5.1.2 Scenarios 5–6 (0% and 100% inefficient flows) 
 
Figure 5. Scenarios 5–6: 0% and 100% inefficient flows. 
UFAPD and WFAPD results are binary: they indicate either 0% or 100% inefficiency. SCURED, 
UIIU and PWIIU provide greater accuracy as they are relative to NTC. SCURED is undefined 
for Scenario 6 as that metric solely focuses on FWPDs. SCURED and UIIU are identical in the 
absence of inefficient flows (Scenario 5). WFAPD understates inefficiency in Scenario 5 as by 
design it is not rescaled by NTC. 
5.1.2.1 Scenarios 7–8 (Low NTC utilisation) 
 
Figure 6. Scenarios 7–8: Low NTC utilisation. 
Scenario 7 represents very low inefficient NTC utilisation with a low number of inefficient flows 
that occur at extreme price differentials, whereas Scenario 8 represents very low inefficient 
NTC utilisation with a low number of FWPDs that occur at extreme price differentials. UFAPD 
provides an unrealistically low inefficiency in Scenario 7 since it only focuses on the low 
number of inefficient flows. WFAPD provides underestimates in both scenarios because it is 
not weighted by available NTC. In both scenarios, SCURED is lower than both UIIU and PWIIU 
as it does not account for inefficient flows. 
In general, SCURED converges to UIIU as inefficient-flows and no-flows decrease and will, in 
practice, occasionally exceed UIIU as shown in Scenario 7.16  
 
16 See Figure A3 in the SI. Results of metrics by year and by hour of the day for selected years are reported in 
Figure A4 and Figure A5 of the SI, respectively. 
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5.1.3 Scenarios 9–11 (1 inefficient flow and 0% inefficient flows) 
 
Figure 7. Scenarios 9–11: 1 inefficient flow and 0% inefficient flows. 
Scenario 9 has just one efficient flow at 90%, yet SCURED estimates only 10% inefficiency. 
All of the other examined metrics are able to detect the extremely high numbers of inefficient 
flows at large volumes. In this scenario, UFAPD and WFAPD are very similar to UIIU and 
PWIIU as a substantial number of inefficient flows occurred at a high percentage of NTC. The 
four large favourable price differentials (>€105) in Scenario 10 are only captured at 50% NTC 
but they are captured at 100% NTC in Scenario 1117. As PWIIU is weighted by price, it is the 
only metric between Scenarios 10 and 11 that detects a change (from 36.9% to 34.1%) 
whereas the other metrics retain their respective values. 
5.2 Historical dataset 
Table 4 reports the results for the examined metrics based on historical data ranging between 
2013 and 2018 in relation to IFA and BritNed. Annual results based on ENTSO-E IFA cross-
border physical flows are in Appendix Table A1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 See Figure A6 in the SI. 
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A. IFA 
Year  N  N+ N- N0 UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2013  8,760  7669 1090 1 12.4% 1.7% 8.1% 17.2% 5.2% 
2014  8,760  8395 360 5 4.1% 0.2% 0.8% 4.2% 0.4% 
2015  8,759  8017 737 5 8.4% 0.3% 1.4% 8.4% 0.5% 
2016  8,783  8572 141 70 1.6% 0% 6.7% 9.3% 1% 
2017  8,759  8623 20 116 0.2% 0% 8.3% 9.7% 1.4% 
2018  8,760  8604 27 129 0.3% 0% 6.8% 8.0% 0.7% 
 
B. BritNed 
Year  N  N+ N- N0 UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2013  8,760  7068 1541 151 15.9% 2.7% 14.2% 24.8% 11.0% 
2014  8,760  6758 781 1221 5.1% 0.5% 2.1% 19.8% 16.0% 
2015  8,760  8122 505 133 5.8% 0.2% 4.6% 10.1% 2.6% 
2016  8,784  8493 185 106 2.1% 0.08% 5.3% 8.0% 4.8% 
2017  8,760  8418 234 108 2.7% 0.2% 8.4% 11.3% 3% 
2018  8,760  8283 347 130 4.0% 0.3% 12% 15.8% 3.9% 
Table 4. Annual historical dataset results (Panel A. IFA; Panel B. BritNed) for the examined metrics. 
EUPHEMIA day-ahead market coupling was implemented in early 2014. Results are reported up to 1 
significant figure. N+, N-, and N0 indicate flows in the correct economic direction, in the wrong economic 
direction, and no flows, respectively. 
5.2.1 Years 2013–2016 
All metrics show a general decrease in inefficiency between the years before market coupling 
(2013-2014) and the years after coupling (2014-2018). Although the level of inefficiency could 
only be compared to a single pre-coupling year, a general decrease in inefficient 
interconnector use was observed between GB and both France and the Netherlands after day-
ahead coupling went live in 2014. 
Interestingly, there was a slight deterioration in 2014-2015. In 2016, SCURED, UIIU and 
PWIIU see an increase in inefficiency. This is due to the underutilisation of NTC by inefficient 
flows compared to the previous year. PWIIU compounds the 2016 underutilisation with the 
corresponding large price differentials.18 The average % NTC utilisation decreases in 2015 
and 2016. Finally, the increase in the number of no-flows (𝑁𝑁0) is only recorded by the new 
metrics UIIU and PWIIU, and not by others. 
This might be explained by the fact that coupling not always results in a decrease in flows 
against the price differential, which was observed when the Italian market was price-coupled 
with France, Austria and Slovenia. (See European Commission, QREEM Q1-2015, Section 
4.4.). During this period, there was a shift from price coupling to flow-based market coupling, 
which might explain these results, since the new coupling process is predominantly based on 
flows as opposed to both flows and prices (Van den Bergh et al., 2016). 
5.2.2 Market coupling during years 2016–2018 
Most indices for IFA measure more efficient interconnector trading in 2018 compared to 2017 
and 2016.19 UFAPD and WFAPD show a near-zero level of inefficiency in 2018 that the other 
metrics do not exhibit, as they are over-reliant on inefficient flows and ignore NTC utilisation 
inefficiency. An understanding of the reasons behind this improvement requires additional 
 
18 In a similar fashion to scenario 10. 
19 Not for BritNed as the data is simulated under the assumption of perfect market coupling (after taking the Mid 
Channel loss factor into consideration). 
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analysis, potentially using our metrics as explanatory variables in regression analysis. The 
markets are perfectly coupled after adjusting loss factor for IFA of 1.17% and for BritNed of 
3%. The reason for non-zero FAPDs and WFAPDs is simply because: (1) using the unadjusted 
price differential; and (2) publicly available data from ENTSO-E and RTE data contains several 
reporting issues. It is also possible for part of this to be a result of improvements through 
learning-by-doing in electricity trading after the implementation of market coupling rules in 
2014. 
5.2.3 Market coupling analysis using monthly intervals 
At monthly intervals, the historical data produced periods similar to our stress data in which 
the existing metrics failed to fully incorporate the interconnector utilisation information (NTC, 
flow direction, price differential) and, when compared to either of the new metrics, varied 
substantially. In these instances, the two new metrics, UIIU and PWIIU, provide greater 
accuracy. Plots of these occurrences and an excerpt from Appendix Tables A9 and A10 
displaying high discrepancies are provided in Figure 8 for IFA. 
 
Year Month N+ N- N0 UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2014 12 622 119 3 16% 0.7% 4% 16% 2% 
2018 6 720 0 0 0% 0% 14% 13% 12% 
Figure 8. Plots of interconnector utilisation patterns for selected months when the examined metrics 
differed significantly from the new metrics here introduced. N+, N-, and N0 indicate flows in the correct 
economic direction, in the wrong economic direction, and no flows, respectively. Results are reported up 
to 1 significant figure. 
We highlight the following results from Appendix Table A9: 
1. SCURED and UIIU coincide in the absence of inefficient flows and no-flows (Jan 2018); 
2. UFAPD and WFAPD understate the degree of interconnector inefficiency (Jun 2018);  
3. The occurrence in April 2018 when UIIU<PWIIU, where despite all flows being efficient, 
available NTC was not fully utilised during high price differentials.20   
 
20 See Figure A8 in the SI. 
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6 Trading inefficiency and market coupling 
The results relating to the impact of market coupling on trading inefficiency, price differentials, 
net import, congestion revenue, and infra-marginal surplus are reported in detail in Appendix 
E. Here, we provide a summary in relation to IFA and BritNed. 
6.1.1 IFA 
Among our main findings, market coupling led the price differential between GB and France 
to fall by €0.40/MWh (2.9%), net imports into GB to increase by 3.27 TWh (or by 34.4%), 
congestion income to increase by €23.4 million (or by 10.6%), and infra-marginal surplus to 
increase by €3.8 million (or 30.4%). 
We compare the inefficiency of the coupled and uncoupled markets using the examined 
trading inefficiency metrics, with results shown in Table A16. Market coupling reduced the 
inefficiency of cross-border trading. On average, during 2014-2019, the share of FAPDs fell 
from 13.3% to a negligible 2.8%, and the Weighted FAPDs (WFAPDs) from 1.5% to only 0.1%. 
PWIIU, UIIU, and SCURED also considerably decreased.  
We also simulated the cases where the GB Carbon Price Support (CPS) is removed, finding 
that when GB and French day-ahead prices are reasonably close (in 2016-2018), and when 
markets are uncoupled, all metrics of inefficiency would be significantly higher than the cases 
where the CPS has been implemented and the GB price is much greater than the French price. 
This is because when prices are closer together, it is much more difficult to accurately forecast 
the sign of a price differential between two markets, hence the direction of flows, resulting in 
greater trading inefficiency. 
Without the CPS, average differences in prices (€/MWh), net imports (TWh), congestion 
income (million €), and infra-marginal surplus (million €) for coupled and uncoupled trading 
over IFA between 2016-2018 are reported in the last three rows of Appendix Table A12.  The 
impact of uncoupling on congestion income and infra-marginal surplus would have been 
slightly higher than with the CPS. This is, again, because the comparable price levels bring 
more uncertainty towards the sign of the price differentials as well as the efficient direction of 
the flows. Specifically, with uncoupling, congestion income would on average have fallen by 
€26.7m/yr without the CPS, compared to €23.4m/yr with the CPS, a difference of 1.4% of the 
coupled congestion income, and the difference in the loss of infra-marginal surplus is less than 
1% of coupled congestion income. 
6.1.2 BritNed 
We assess the impact of market coupling on BritNed, with results shown in Table A16. 
Similarly to IFA, market coupling facilitates price convergence, and raises congestion revenue 
and infra-marginal surplus. GB also imported more because the GB price was almost always 
greater than the Dutch price during 2015-2018.  
On average, market coupling reduced the price differential between GB and the Netherlands 
by €0.28/MWh (by 1.8%), increased net imports into GB by 1.03 TWh/yr (by 14.9%), raised 
congestion income  by €6.7 m/yr (by 5.4%), and boosted infra-marginal surplus by €1.8 m/yr 
(by 18.8% of uncoupled infra-marginal surplus). The impact of market coupling on BritNed is 
smaller than that on IFA. This is not only because of BritNed’s lower capacity, but also because 
the price differential between GB and the Netherlands is much larger than that between GB 
and France, meaning there is less uncertainty on the sign of the GB-NL price differential. 
Relative to IFA, uncoupling BritNed would have a lower impact on FAPDs as well as 
congestion income and infra-marginal surplus.  
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Similarly to IFA, the removal of asymmetric carbon taxes would result in spot price 
convergence between GB and the Netherlands. As a result, uncoupling the interconnector 
would have slightly higher impact on both congestion income and infra-marginal surplus. 
Table A16 compares trading inefficiency for BritNed, with and without market coupling during 
2015-2018. Again, uncoupling increases trading inefficiency. UFAPD (WFAPD) increased 
from 3% (0.1%) to 10.8% (1.7%). SCURED, UIUU, and PWIIU also substantially increased.  
It is also worth mentioning that the metrics (I1-5) shown in Table A16 based on uncoupled 
markets during 2015-2018 are smaller than the metrics in 2013, where BritNed was also 
uncoupled. This is because in 2013, the average GB-NL price differential was €7.11/MWh, or 
much lower compared to 2015-2018, as shown in Appendix Table A16 (on average 
€15.2/MWh under market coupling). This confirms our earlier finding where if prices are closer 
together, uncoupling would have a more negative impact on trading inefficiency (although in 
absolute terms as the prices are closer, the gains from trade are smaller, amplifying the 
proportional inefficiency).  
Without carbon tax asymmetries, the electricity prices between GB and both France and the 
Netherlands would converge. As a result, the impact of market uncoupling would lead to large 
changes in trade but the value of that trade would be lower. Removing carbon tax asymmetries 
would reduce deadweight losses and improve social welfare, demonstrating that these 
measures based on commercial income are not necessarily a guide to sensible decisions that 
should be based on social welfare.  
7 Discussion 
Interconnectors have provided welfare benefits to electricity systems, and these have been 
increased where market coupling has been introduced, at least where the connected markets 
are workably competitive and undistorted (Newbery et al., 2019). The two new metrics we 
have introduced in this paper are able to compare both coupled and uncoupled markets 
on the same scale, and this innovation enables them to outperform metrics that are currently 
used to measure inefficient trading, including UFAPD, WFAPD, and SCURED, with the proviso 
that they are based on commercial incomes that may not properly measure social value. 
In an uncoupled market with a very high number of inefficient flow occurrences, SCURED will 
be inaccurate as inefficient flows are not part of that metric; UIIU and PWIIU provide greater 
accuracy as they capture inefficient flows. Conversely in a coupled market with no inefficient 
flows but where electricity exchanges occurred at low utilisation levels of NTC, efficient and 
inefficient flows will be inaccurate as NTC is not captured by those metrics; UIIU and PWIIU 
will again provide a higher degree of accuracy as NTC is directly considered in UIIU and PWIIU. 
This consistently superior performance of UIIU and PWIIU (irrespective of the state of market 
coupling) should provide confidence in their use. Furthermore, the increased accuracy of UIIU 
and PWIIU does not incur any mathematical-complexity penalty. 
7.1 Added value of new metrics 
Despite their significant drawbacks, regulators are familiar with UFAPD, WFAPD, and 
SCURED, which have been widely used in measuring the implementation success of market 
coupling. The new measures (UIIU and PWIUU) address the shortcomings of such metrics by 
including the dimensions that each of those metrics lack. The similarity between the new 
metrics, UFAPD, and SCURED, is such that under special circumstances, UIIU can be 
described as a function of those two as in Equation (6). UIIU and PWIIU can be considered 
generalisations of UFAPD, WFAPD and SCURED.  
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If all flows are FWPDs, UFAPD and WFAPD will measure perfect interconnector utilisation by 
recording a value of 0% inefficiency. Yet as was shown in relation to the stress and historical 
datasets, this will not be the case if the capacity of the interconnector is not fully utilised. UIIU 
and PWIIU include available NTC as a variable in their computation and so are more accurate. 
Conversely, if inefficient flows are more likely, SCURED will underestimate the true 
inefficiency. Again, as UIIU and PWIIU factor inefficient flows in the calculation, they will 
provide a higher degree of accuracy. 
The computational requirements of UIIU and PWIIU are similar to the other metrics and can 
be implemented in a spreadsheet using built-in functions. To simplify this process, we have 
included two example spreadsheets in the supporting information. 
7.2 Limitations of current metrics 
The most commonly used metrics to measure trading efficiency, UFAPD and WFAPD, were 
introduced in parallel to major market coupling initiatives that took place in the last quarter of 
2010 across Europe, including price coupling in the Central-Western European (CWE) region 
and volume coupling in the CWE-Nordic region (EU Commission, 2010b).  After these 
initiatives were introduced, inefficient flows largely decreased, nearly disappearing in Q1-2011 
in CWE (See EU Commission, 2012-Q3; 2012-Q4). Yet we have shown that existing metrics 
solely based on historical information using price differentials and flows are no longer fit-for-
purpose when monitoring trading efficiency during the absence of coupling as well as the 
progress in coupling markets. 
The new metrics that we have proposed are particularly useful to measure the inefficiency of 
trading in uncoupled markets, since they emphasise meaningful flows against price 
differentials. For the UK, which is planning to leave the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice and possibly end market coupling with neighbouring countries, the metrics could be 
used to accurately identify and minimise trading inefficiencies. 
On the other hand, as coupled markets progress toward a state where inefficient flows are no 
longer observed across borders, the bias from inefficient flows that affects existing metrics 
limits their utility for evaluating the level of inefficiency of available cross-zonal capacity 
utilisation. Inefficiency should not only be a measure of inefficient flows, but also one of 
underutilisation of the available capacity when it is efficient to import or export electricity. 
Moreover, the introduction of coupling does not always result in a decrease in flows against 
the price differential, which was observed when the Italian market was price-coupled with 
France, Austria and Slovenia (See EU Commission, 2015-Q1). 
The inception of the SCURED index (ACER/CEER, 2012) occurred after most market coupling 
initiatives were put in place. This measure was mainly used when inefficient flows were 
expected to be small, which may explain the bias on efficient flows and the verified failure of 
this measure in scenarios with inefficient flows. The left panel in Figure 2 suggests a situation 
where cross-zonal exchanges between the Belgian and Dutch markets in Q1-2011 were in 
the correct economic direction 99.99% of the time capturing small price differentials close to 
€1/MWh at 70% of the interconnector’s capacity. As SCURED focuses on beneficial capacity 
utilisation, it inclines toward reporting an inefficiency of 30%, but this would be an 
understatement of the monetary inefficiency where 53% (€1.8m/€3.4m) were exchanged 
during inefficient flows (see Figure 2). The fact that this index does not address inefficient 
flows in such a situation is a clear flaw of the metric because it focuses on the volumetric 
dimension and ignores the price differential dimension. 
We summarise the drawbacks of the most commonly used metrics of market coupling as: 
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 UFAPD: fails to incorporate price differential magnitude and available NTC. 
 WFAPD: fails to incorporate available NTC. 
 SCURED: fails to incorporate inefficient flows and the price differential magnitude. 
Despite their shortcomings, one key benefit of UFAPD, WFAPD, and SCURED is their ease 
of implementation, as they do not include information about the level of electricity loads or 
generation and as such can be replicated using simple methods and the use of publicly 
available price and flow data. This is in contrast to metrics from electricity system models, 
which estimate the impact of market coupling in terms of social costs and benefits. 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
The third term in Equations 4 and 5 deal with occurrences of no-flows in the presence of a 
non-zero price differential. There is however a discontinuity in the S-curve (see Figure A1 in 
the SI) when the price differential is exactly zero. From an arbitrageur’s perspective it would 
be uneconomic21 to import/export electricity if prices in both markets were in equilibrium and 
flows across interconnectors can occur for reasons other than economic profitability. We have 
ignored zero price differentials22 across all of our analyses by filtering out such occurrences 
from our computations. With full price convergence across the IEM, the tendency is for prices 
across different regions to equilibrate over time and result in greater occurrences of price 
differentials being exactly equal to zero. While an increasing number of such occurrences will 
diminish the accuracy of UIIU and PWIIU, such situations are highly unlikely. 
Post market coupling data such as cross-zonal flow, electricity price and NTC are available 
for several markets for recent years since coupling but are limited for the pre-coupling period. 
This limitation constrained our study to focus on one interconnector (IFA) and one market 
coupling model (FBMC). Additional insights into the metrics’ relative performance in 
measuring the success of market coupling can be gained by widening the scope of the 
analysis to include other market coupling models and/or other interconnectors.  
As the new metrics measure the distance from the efficient S-curve-shaped trading pattern, 
they have no knowledge of operational/engineering constraints in the interconnector that might 
have resulted in inefficient flows, or lack of flows during an existing price differential. Such 
inefficiencies would be incorrectly captured by UIIU and PWIIU and would result in an 
overestimation of the inefficiency. Any model or metric is only as good as the data it is provided 
with, and with the appropriate data preparation, these metrics can provide a useful indication 
of trading efficiency. 
There are ramping constraints that limit the rate of change of interconnector flows (e.g. 
1%/minute maximum change), which can cause apparently inefficient flows if there are large 
price swings (e.g. caused by the one-hour time difference between GB and France during the 
early morning rise in demand. 
The analysis has assumed that market prices reflect social costs, and this is clearly not the 
case when GB imposes an additional carbon tax that is not matched by its neighbours. 
Newbery et al. (2019) show how to measure social costs and benefits as distinct from 
commercial income. 
 
21 Due to friction costs such as bilateral credit limits, exchange margining, etc. 
22 The simulated dataset did not include any zero price differential. In the six-year historical dataset, our 
calculations showed only 5 hours of zero price differential.  
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Finally, it would be worthwhile to relate the various weighting schemes to the economic cost 
of the trade errors. Yet this would require more detailed structural modelling of the underlying 
private and social trading costs.  
7.4 Policy implications 
Market coupling followed from a series of EU legislative packages that laid the foundations of 
the EU Internal Electricity Market. Any tool used to monitor changes in trading inefficiency 
must not be biased by market conditions. We have shown in Figure 8 that current metrics can 
substantially overstate or understate the benefits of market coupling, which could underpin 
poor market design decisions in the future. 
Interconnector regulatory regimes vary widely, from fully regulated regimes in which 
interconnector revenues are part of the total remuneration to transmission, with excess 
congestion revenue passed back to consumers, to full market regimes in which revenues are 
sought competitively from congestion rents. A ‘cap and floor’ mechanism was introduced to 
GB interconnectors in 2013 as a hybrid of these two approaches, with the aim of continuing 
the market-based approach while reducing the risk of investment losses for interconnector 
owners. Under this regime, any shortfall in revenues below a pre-imposed floor is paid for by 
consumers through higher network charges. Since interconnector congestion rent is expected 
to decrease due to the fall in price differentials that follows the coupling of electricity markets, 
it is important to accurately track trading inefficiency to ensure the cap and floor levels are 
appropriate. 
The current Flow Based Market Coupling (FBMC) adapted into the EUPHEMIA algorithm is 
one of several available coupling models to have been adopted in the EU (EU Commission, 
2010), in addition to others such as Interim Tight Volume Coupling (ITVC) and Price Coupling. 
The relative success of each model can only be evaluated if accurate metrics are available. 
ACER (2017) compared the success of intra-day market coupling for a selection of regions 
and concluded that markets using implicit allocation are 40% inefficient while those using 
explicit allocation are 53% inefficient. However, they focus exclusively on flows that have ‘a 
value’ (i.e. those flowing in the correct economic direction) and so ignore inefficient flows. 
Excluding such information from the headline figures leaves room to the possibility of over- or 
under-stating the relative benefits of implicit and explicit allocation models. This can be 
remedied by using metrics such UIIU and PWIIU as they include as many meaningful factors 
in their calculations as possible. 
7.5 Market uncoupling: inefficiency and economic loss  
Trading in an uncoupled market could substantially increase the inefficiency of cross-border 
trading between GB and both France and the Netherlands unless compensated by trading on 
local power exchanges and buying physical capacity on interconnectors ahead of time.23 It 
discourages market price convergence (not the same as social cost convergence), yielding a 
3% larger GB-FR average price differential relative to market coupling. Risk-averse traders 
may not make full use of capacity on IFA and market uncoupling could result in a some 
reduction in congestion revenue, result in suboptimal use of the interconnector and an 
attendant very slight loss in infra-marginal (market, not social) surplus. 
GB’s day-ahead price is typically greater than the French day-ahead price, partly due to 
asymmetric carbon taxes between the two markets. As a result, with the French market closing 
before the GB market, despite uncoupling bringing uncertainty toward GB prices, a trader 
 
23 The simulations used to measure the impact of uncoupling do not model such compensatory actions 
by traders, and so should be treated with great caution. 
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would still believe that GB’s price would most likely be greater than the French price, and 
would therefore schedule to import electricity most of the time. When the price differences are 
predicted to be small, the imported amount could be lower, resulting in inefficient use of the 
interconnector, although the value of the loss would also be small. The impact of market 
coupling on BritNed is similar, but smaller due to the lower NTC as well as the greater GB-NL 
price differential.  
We also find that, if the British Carbon Price Support (CPS) asymmetry were removed, ideally 
by the EU implementing an equivalent CPS across its member states, then GB prices would 
converge to Continental market prices. In such cases the impact of market coupling on traded 
volumes would be higher than with the asymmetric carbon tax (but not the absolute value of 
congestion income, which would be smaller). Again, it needs stressing tha removing the 
asymmetry would deliver welfare gains that may well outweigh the impact of uncoupling. 
8 Conclusions 
Monitoring the efficiency of electricity trades between countries is essential to ensure that 
welfare gains from policies designed to improve market integration – including market coupling 
and policies to spur investments in new interconnectors – are achieved. We have 
systematically reviewed the metrics used by policymakers to measure cross-border electricity 
trading inefficiency and have identified several deficiencies, which cause their accuracy to 
vary greatly depending on the trading patterns. Using both hypothetical market conditions and 
historical data, we have shown that some metrics rely too much on inefficient flows (the indices 
UFAPD and WFAPD) or efficient flows (SCURED). We have developed two new metrics of 
market coupling that address these issues.  
Our UIIU and PWIIU metrics leverage available information on basic interconnector use such 
as available NTC, flow direction, and price differential magnitude. Importantly, the new metrics 
are not impaired by the state of market coupling, which facilitates comparisons between 
countries and over time. 
We have demonstrated that the new indices are not affected by extreme price and flow 
differentials. They consistently define the degree of trading inefficiency under numerous 
potential market conditions, which both provides confidence and further emphasises the 
limitations of existing measures. Given the improvements, we believe they should be used 
instead of existing metrics, where possible, to measure the efficiency of electricity trading 
between countries and to evaluate the impacts of market coupling. 
In addition, we studied the impact of market uncoupling on cross-border trade. We found that 
market uncoupling would lead to more inefficient trading. It would also lead the price 
differential between GB and France (the Netherlands) to rise by €0.4/MWh or by 3% (by 
€0.3/MWh, or 2%), net imports into GB to decline by 3.3 TWh or 34% (1 TWh/yr, or 15%), 
congestion income to reduce by €23 million, or 11% (€7 m/yr, or 5%), and infra-marginal 
surplus to decline by €4 million, or 30% (€2 m/yr, or 19%). 
The impact of market coupling increases with the capacity of the interconnector, and 
decreases with the average price differential, implying less uncertainty on the sign of the price 
differential and therefore on the direction of flow. Uncoupling would therefore result in greater 
inefficiency and a reduction in congestion income and infra-marginal surplus.  
Finally, we should stress that the metrics deal with market prices and revenues, and in the 
presence of asymmetric carbon prices, these will not reflect social values, nor the social value 
of trade. Additional measures will be needed to uncover and measure such inefficiencies. 
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Appendix A 
1 Methodological appendix: metrics 
1.1 Derivation of the new metrics 
For any hour h of the day, in any two regions A and B, electricity flows of magnitude fh (MW) 
move across an interconnector in the direction AB at a price differential (€/MWh) XBA(h) ≔ 
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PB(h) – PA(h).  Ideally,24 arbitrageurs import electricity into market A from market B when prices 
are lower in B and conversely, import into B from A (AB) when prices are lower in A.  Efficient 
trading behaviour in idealised conditions give rise to the step-curve25 (S-curve) pattern in Left 
diagram of Figure A1. 
 
Figure A1.  Here, the S-curve is reported as a ratio of available to used capacity, as opposed to Figure 1, 
for simplicity. LEFT: S-curve (in red) of the efficient utilisation pattern by interconnector arbitrageurs (blue 
points) across markets A, B.  x-axis denotes the price differential XBA(h).  The y-axis denotes the electricity 
flow as a percentage of NTC in direction AB.  RIGHT: Red and blue areas denote adverse and favourable 
flow quadrants; the blue line is the distance of the inefficient flow from the S-curve.   
The distance of non-maximal flows from the S-curve in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 
A1 is then 
distance(adverse-flows) + distance(favourable-flows) + distance(no-flows) 
which we define as 
𝐼𝐼4 = �𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁 �� 1𝑁𝑁−�� (1 + |𝑓𝑓ℎ−|)2𝑁𝑁−
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where 
𝑁𝑁 = 𝑁𝑁− + 𝑁𝑁+ + 𝑁𝑁0
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓− + 𝑓𝑓+ + 𝑓𝑓0|𝑦𝑦| = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑦𝑦                                                                   𝑓𝑓ℎ = 𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆ℎ 
 
24 Synchronicity of market gate closures and capacity allocation, perfect information set, no physical constrains 
such as ramping, loop-flows, etc. 
25 Under the idealised conditions, arbitrageurs should not import or export when the market prices in region A and 
B are equilibrated and there are positive losses across the  link: Hence the XBA = 0 discontinuity.  
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with the superscripts ‘-‘ , ‘+’, 026, denoting adverse-flow,27 favourable-flow and no-flow, 28 
respectively.  NTC denotes net transfer capacity and 𝑓𝑓ℎ the hourly flow. 
𝐼𝐼4 = (𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)(𝜁𝜁) + �𝑁𝑁+𝑁𝑁 � (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹∗) + �𝑁𝑁0𝑁𝑁 �  
 
1.2 ACER’s NTC metric as a lower bound for new metric 
Rewriting Equation (4) 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈 = (𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)(𝜁𝜁) + �𝑁𝑁+
𝑁𝑁
� (1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹∗) + �𝑁𝑁0
𝑁𝑁
� 
as  
𝐼𝐼4 = �𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁 �𝑋𝑋 + �𝑁𝑁+𝑁𝑁 �𝑌𝑌 
where without loss of generality we’ve assumed 𝑁𝑁0 = 0.  Then, 
�
𝑁𝑁−
𝑁𝑁
�𝑋𝑋 + �𝑁𝑁+
𝑁𝑁
�𝑌𝑌 < 𝑌𝑌 ⇒ 𝑋𝑋 < 𝑌𝑌 
and we establish that whenever the unweighted adverse distance (𝑋𝑋)  is lower than its 
counterpart (𝑌𝑌), SCURED will fail to provide a lower bound for UIIU.29  
1.3 Additional price-weighting schemes 
Equation (5) adjusts to equation (4) by weighing the interconnector underutilisation by price 
differential weight according to wh.   
Other weightings schemes, such as  
𝑤𝑤1 = 𝑥𝑥ℎ2∑𝑥𝑥ℎ2
𝑤𝑤2 = 𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥ℎ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥ℎ
𝑤𝑤3 = 𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽|𝑥𝑥ℎ|∑𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽|𝑥𝑥ℎ|
 
can be applied where the degree of convexity will determine the influence of price differential 
outliers on the computed metric.  Due to its linear nature, our choice of weighting scheme 
results in minimum bias from outliers.  It would be equally appropriate30 to apply a scheme 
 
26 By definition fh0 = 0. 
27 Adverse-flow is synonymous with flow against price differential (FAPD) and analogous with flows in the correct 
economic direction. 
28 A no-flow is the event of zero IC utilisation given that a non-zero price differential occurred. 
29 Although mathematically possible, analysis performed on weekly intervals yielded only 2 such occurrences in a 
total of 314 weekly samples. See Table Appendix A10.  
30 When dealing with underdetermined systems and optimisation.  
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with symmetric emphasis on outliers via w1 (or w3 with 𝛽𝛽 = 0.05), or with adverse flows 
asymmetrically penalised (w2 with 𝛽𝛽 = −0.01).31 
There is a good argument for the quadratic weighting scheme w1 as the cost of distortions or 
the welfare gains from price spread reductions increases as the square of the differentials 
(Newbery, 1990).  
 
Figure A2.  Price differential weighting according to different weighting schemes. w0 is the price differential 
weighting applied in equation (5), w1-w3 as per Section 1.3. of this document (SI)  For w2 and w3, 𝛃𝛃 = -0.01 
and 0.05 respectively. 
2 Additional results 
2.1 Data source (RTE vs ENTSO-E) 
The historical data is sourced as reported in Table 3 of the main paper.  We address the choice 
of flow proxy by applying the same metrics to a different dataset where we replace the RTE 
commercial forecast with ENTSO-E cross-border physical flows.  Results are included (annual 
level only) in this section.  We observe that although the absolute levels change, the behaviour 
of the temporal evolution of the indices does not. 
Year N+ N- N0 UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2013 7,677 1,077 5 12.3% 1.9% 15.6% 23.4% 12.7% 
2014 8,388 370 0 4.2% 0.2% 10.3% 13.2% 9.3% 
2015 8,001 757 0 8.7% 0.3% 11.6% 17.5% 9.6% 
2016 8,405 349 29 4.0% 0.2% 22.5% 24.4% 18.2% 
2017 8,542 208 10 2.4% 0.1% 20.2% 21.2% 14.1% 
2018 8,559 199 1 2.3% 0.1% 18.0% 19.0% 14.1% 
Table A1.  Annual results based on ENTSO-E cross-border physical flows (IFA). 
 
31 Appendix figure A2 provides a profile of these alternative weighting methods.  
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Figure A3.  Results of metrics by year according to the RTE and ENTSO-E flow proxy, respectively (IFA). 
2.2 Data pre-processing 
Pre-processing data can be helpful to focus on a meaningful price differential, or attempt to 
account for reverse flows, loss-factors, etc.  This data reduction can lead to subjective choices 
of thresholds to filter out information to be (or not) included in analysis.  In our analysis, we 
opted not to apply any filtering to the data.  Applying a filter of €1 to the price differential, shows 
how the temporal evolution of the indices remain unchanged.  
 
Figure A4.  Results of metrics by year (IFA).  Filter = X denotes the (absolute) value below which price 
differentials are ignored for the analysis, as done in many ACER and EU Commission reports. 
2.3 UIIU and PWIIU by hour of the day 
 
 Figure A5(a).  Unweighted interconnector inefficient utilisation metric (UIIU) (%, y-axis) averaged by hour 
of the day (x-axis) for selected years, for the IFA interconnector. 
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 Figure A5(b).  Price-Weighted Interconnector Inefficient Utilisation (PWIIU) metric (%, y-axis) averaged by 
hour of the day  (x-axis ) for selected years, for the IFA interconnector. 
3 Worksheet prototype implementation of metrics 
We provide a spreadsheet implementation of both indices here introduced, I1 and I5. 
Date hour flow NTC gb -fr 
01/01/2013 1 1500 1500 € 24.30 
01/01/2013 2 1500 1500 € 28.54 
01/01/2013 3 1500 1500 € 23.42 
Table A2.  Summary table of user input data. 
Interconnector utilisation data is first provided in the format of Table A2.  Intermediate 
calculations in Table A3 are performed with corresponding formulae provided in Table A4.      
flow_adj year month y&m flow/NTC fpd uD(S) |gb_fr| w_h(m) w_h(y) wD(S)_y CR 
1500 2013 1 2013-1 100% 1 0.00% 24.30 0.31% 0.02% 0.00% € 36,456 
1500 2013 1 2013-1 100% 1 0.00% 28.54 0.37% 0.02% 0.00% € 42,817 
1500 2013 1 2013-1 100% 1 0.00% 23.42 0.30% 0.02% 0.00% € 35,123 
Table A3.  Intermediate calculations required for estimation of metrics i1 -- I5.  flow_adj is used only in the 
calculation of SCURED. 
 
 
 
column Formula 
flow_adj =ABS(IF(ABS([@flow])<=[@NTC],[@flow],SIGN([@flow])*[@NTC])) 
year =YEAR([@date]) 
month =MONTH([@date]) 
y&m =[@year]&[@month] 
flow/NTC =[@flow]/[@NTC] 
fpd =SIGN([@[gb-fr]]*[@flow]) 
uD(S) =IFS([@fpd]>0,(1-ABS([@[flow/NTC]])), [@fpd]<0, (1+ABS([@[flow/NTC]]))/2,[@fpd]=0,1) 
|gb_fr| =ABS([@[gb-fr]]) 
w_h(m) =[@[|gb_fr|]]/VLOOKUP([@[y&m]],sum_abs_spreads_months,2,FALSE) 
wD(S)_m =[@[w_h(m)]]*[@[uD(S)]] 
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w_h(y) =[@[|gb_fr|]]/VLOOKUP([@year],sum_abs_spreads_years,2,FALSE) 
wD(S)_y =[@[w_h(y)]]*[@[uD(S)]] 
CR =[@[gb-fr]]*[@flow] 
Table A4.  Formulae for intermediate calculations in Table A7.  Boldface denotes named ranges described 
in Tables A5 and A6.   
The spreadsheet ‘Table B’ object is the union of Tables A2 and A3 and is used in the final 
calculation of the annual and monthly results of Table A9 and A10 with their respective 
formulae provided in Tables A7 and A8. 
Y&M M_sum(| x |) Formula 
2013-1 7735 =SUMIFS(Table13[|gb_fr|],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1") 
2013-2 5506 =SUMIFS(Table13[|gb_fr|],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=2") 
2013-3 10922 =SUMIFS(Table13[|gb_fr|],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=3") 
Table A5.  Detail of 'sum_abs_spreads_months' named range.  The named range is given by the first two 
columns.  The thirds column is the formula for column two (M_sum|x|). 
Year Y_sum(|x|) Formula 
2013 152536 = SUMIF(Table13[year],"=2013",Table13[|gb_fr|]) 
2014 155106 = SUMIF(Table13[year],"=2014",Table13[|gb_fr|]) 
2015 153612 = SUMIF(Table13[year],"=2015",Table13[|gb_fr|]) 
Table A6.  Detail of 'sum_abs_spreads_years’ named range.  The named range is given by the first two 
columns.  The third column is the formula for column two (Y_sum|x|). 
column Formula 
N =COUNTIF(Table13[year],"=2013") 
N+ =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013",Table13[fpd],"1") 
N- =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013",Table13[fpd],"-1") 
N0 =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013",Table13[fpd],"0") 
I1 =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013",Table13[fpd],"-1")/COUNTIF(Table13[year],"=2013") 
I2 =ABS(SUMIFS(Table13[CR],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[fpd],"=-1"))/(SUMIFS(Table13[CR],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[fpd],"=1") + ABS(SUMIFS(Table13[CR],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[fpd],"=-1"))) 
I3 1 - (SUMIFS(Table13[flow_adj],Table13[year],CONCATENATE("=",T2),Table13[fpd],"=1")/ 
SUMIFS(Table13[NTC],Table13[year], CONCATENATE("=",T2),Table13[fpd],"=1")) 
I4 =(SUMIFS(Table13[uD(S)],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[fpd],"=1")+SUMIFS(Table13[uD(S)],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[fpd],"=-1")+SUMIFS(Table13[uD(S)],Table13[year],"=2013",Table13[fpd],"=0"))/COUNTIF(Table13[year],"=2013") 
I5 =(SUMIFS(Table13[wD(S)_y],Table13[year],"=2013",Table13[fpd],"=1")+SUMIFS(Table13[wD(S)_y],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[fpd],"=-1")+SUMIFS(Table13[wD(S)_y],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[fpd],"=0")) 
Table A7.  Formulae corresponding to columns in Table A4.  The example provided is for calendar year 
2013. 
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column Formula 
N =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1") 
N+ =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"1") 
N- =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"-1") 
N0 =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"0") 
I1 =COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"-1")/COUNTIFS(Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[month],"=1") 
I2 =ABS(SUMIFS(Table13[CR],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=-
1"))/(SUMIFS(Table13[CR],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=1") + 
ABS(SUMIFS(Table13[CR],Table13[year],"=2013", Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=-1"))) 
I3 =1-(SUMIFS(Table13[flow_adj],Table13[year],CONCATENATE("=",AH2), 
Table13[month],CONCATENATE("=",AI2),Table13[fpd],"=1")/SUMIFS(Table13[NTC],Table13[year],CONCATENATE("=",A
H2), Table13[month],CONCATENATE("=",AI2),Table13[fpd],"=1")) 
I4 =(SUMIFS(Table13[uD(S)],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=1")+SUMIFS(Table13[uD(S)],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=-1")+SUMIFS(Table13[uD(S)],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=0"))/AI2 
I5 =(SUMIFS(Table13[wD(S)_m],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=1")+SUMIFS(Table13[wD(S)_m],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=-1")+SUMIFS(Table13[wD(S)_m],Table13[year],"=2013", 
Table13[month],"=1",Table13[fpd],"=0")) 
Table A8.  Formulae corresponding to the columns in Table A4.  The example provided is for the month of 
January 2013. 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure A7.  Plot of GB-FR Day-ahead price vs FR->GB RTE flow.  Y-axis is flow re-scaled by NTC.  Day-
ahead NWE coupling went live on 04-02-2014. 
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Appendix C 
3.1 IFA 
Year Month N+ N- N0 UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2013 1 567 177 0 23.80% 5.20% 21.30% 32.70% 16.30% 
2013 2 482 190 0 28.30% 9.00% 28.00% 39.30% 26.20% 
2013 3 608 136 0 18.30% 4.00% 32.30% 36.80% 23.60% 
2013 4 603 117 0 16.30% 3.60% 9.70% 21.10% 10.80% 
2013 5 717 27 0 3.60% 0.30% 0.50% 3.60% 0.50% 
2013 6 713 7 0 1.00% 0.10% 15.00% 13.00% 11.40% 
2013 7 726 18 0 2.40% 0.20% 2.40% 4.50% 2.30% 
2013 8 721 23 0 3.10% 0.30% 14.00% 15.00% 11.20% 
2013 9 670 50 0 6.90% 0.80% 7.60% 11.90% 5.50% 
2013 10 643 100 0 13.50% 2.30% 31.70% 34.20% 24.90% 
2013 11 623 97 0 13.50% 1.90% 17.60% 22.70% 10.30% 
2013 12 597 147 0 19.80% 3.90% 16.10% 28.80% 9.80% 
2014 1 698 46 0 6.20% 0.70% 2.30% 7.50% 1.50% 
2014 2 649 23 0 3.40% 0.60% 1.70% 4.40% 1.10% 
2014 3 729 15 0 2.00% 0.10% 31.50% 31.40% 31.20% 
2014 4 702 18 0 2.50% 0.10% 2.60% 4.00% 1.30% 
2014 5 734 10 0 1.30% 0.00% 0.70% 1.70% 0.40% 
2014 6 702 18 0 2.50% 0.10% 19.10% 20.10% 18.60% 
2014 7 744 0 0 0% 0% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 
2014 8 740 4 0 0.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 
2014 9 704 16 0 2.20% 0.10% 9.10% 10.70% 9.80% 
2014 10 668 74 1 10.00% 0.50% 24.50% 29.00% 24.40% 
2014 11 703 17 0 2.40% 0.10% 0.20% 2.30% 0.10% 
2014 12 622 119 3 16.00% 0.70% 3.80% 15.60% 2.20% 
2015 1 596 148 0 19.90% 1.40% 21.60% 32.70% 21.60% 
2015 2 513 156 3 23.20% 1.90% 11.00% 27.40% 8.80% 
2015 3 656 86 2 11.60% 0.60% 14.20% 21.90% 15.10% 
2015 4 701 19 0 2.60% 0.10% 5.80% 6.80% 3.90% 
2015 5 739 5 0 0.70% 0.00% 0.30% 0.90% 0.10% 
2015 6 717 3 0 0.40% <0.01% 2.00% 2.30% 2.20% 
2015 7 722 22 0 3.00% 0.10% 0.30% 2.90% 0.30% 
2015 8 743 1 0 0.10% <0.01% 0.00% 0.20% <0.01% 
2015 9 712 8 0 1.10% 0.00% 0.10% 1.10% 0.10% 
2015 10 631 112 1 15.10% 0.80% 32.70% 38.20% 31.10% 
2015 11 632 88 0 12.20% 0.60% 8.10% 16.40% 5.90% 
2015 12 655 89 0 12.00% 0.40% 5.70% 14.40% 4.00% 
2016 1 689 55 0 7.40% 0.20% 4.70% 9.70% 1.10% 
2016 2 675 21 0 3.00% 0.10% 0.50% 3.00% 0.20% 
2016 3 734 10 0 1.30% 0.10% 0.30% 1.50% 0.20% 
2016 4 718 2 0 0.30% <0.01% 19.80% 19.90% 21.10% 
2016 5 744 0 0 0% 0% 0.30% 0.20% <0.01% 
2016 6 720 0 0 0% 0% 9.80% 9.60% 8.60% 
2016 7 744 0 0 0% 0% 7.30% 6.70% 6.70% 
2016 8 737 7 0 0.90% <0.01% 6.20% 6.20% 0.50% 
2016 9 692 28 0 3.90% <0.01% 42.10% 42.50% 33.90% 
2016 10 704 8 32 1.10% <0.01% 52.40% 44.90% 44.20% 
2016 11 698 4 18 0.60% <0.01% 25.30% 19.50% 13.30% 
2016 12 718 6 20 0.80% <0.01% 57.30% 54.90% 49.70% 
Table A9. Monthly historical dataset results for years 2013 to 2016 for all indices UFAPD–PWIIU (IFA). 
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3.2 BritNed 
Year Month N N+ N- N0 UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2013 1 744 592 150 2 20.2% 3.5% 21.4% 31.3% 14.0% 
2013 2 672 584 86 2 12.8% 1.4% 16.1% 23.3% 7.9% 
2013 3 744 630 113 1 15.2% 3.1% 7.6% 18.6% 6.3% 
2013 4 720 528 191 1 26.5% 6.7% 24.3% 36.8% 21.2% 
2013 5 744 563 181 0 24.3% 4.5% 18.1% 30.8% 14.6% 
2013 6 720 585 123 12 17.1% 2.6% 16.8% 25.7% 14.8% 
2013 7 744 666 78 0 10.5% 1.8% 7.5% 15.2% 5.0% 
2013 8 744 662 82 0 11.0% 2.0% 8.9% 16.8% 6.3% 
2013 9 720 525 74 121 10.3% 1.6% 14.4% 17.6% 23.1% 
2013 10 744 616 123 5 16.5% 2.2% 14.3% 24.0% 8.2% 
2013 11 720 635 85 0 11.8% 1.6% 10.9% 18.5% 6.5% 
2013 12 744 635 108 1 14.5% 2.2% 13.5% 22.4% 8.9% 
2014 1 744 635 60 49 8.1% 1.0% 4.3% 16.6% 10.0% 
2014 2 672 0 0 672 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.3% 100.0% 
2014 3 744 417 16 311 2.2% 0.2% 2.2% 9.5% 46.5% 
2014 4 720 696 24 0 3.3% 0.2% 3.0% 12.3% 0.7% 
2014 5 744 704 39 1 5.2% 0.4% 2.1% 12.7% 1.2% 
2014 6 720 678 42 0 5.8% 0.5% 2.1% 13.5% 1.0% 
2014 7 744 725 19 0 2.6% 0.2% 0.9% 9.5% 0.4% 
2014 8 744 713 31 0 4.2% 0.3% 1.7% 11.5% 0.7% 
2014 9 720 527 32 161 4.4% 0.5% 2.2% 12.2% 28.1% 
2014 10 744 703 41 0 5.5% 0.4% 1.4% 12.7% 0.7% 
2014 11 720 687 33 0 4.6% 0.2% 1.4% 12.0% 0.5% 
2014 12 744 608 112 24 15.1% 1.2% 2.8% 21.3% 4.9% 
2015 1 744 664 80 0 10.75% 0.57% 7.43% 14.85% 1.73% 
2015 2 672 617 55 0 8.18% 0.39% 8.62% 13.93% 1.64% 
2015 3 744 708 36 0 4.84% 0.18% 5.75% 9.04% 0.94% 
2015 4 720 710 10 0 1.39% 0.05% 2.36% 3.34% 0.33% 
2015 5 744 642 36 66 4.84% 0.19% 3.10% 6.27% 7.10% 
2015 6 720 693 27 0 3.75% 0.18% 3.79% 6.61% 0.55% 
2015 7 744 714 30 0 4.03% 0.17% 3.19% 6.01% 0.54% 
2015 8 744 726 18 0 2.42% 0.11% 2.27% 4.06% 0.38% 
2015 9 720 643 12 65 1.67% 0.10% 4.04% 5.02% 13.76% 
2015 10 744 691 51 2 6.85% 0.26% 5.48% 10.30% 1.03% 
2015 11 720 654 66 0 9.17% 0.37% 4.64% 11.06% 0.94% 
2015 12 744 660 84 0 11.29% 0.30% 5.27% 13.16% 0.84% 
2016 1 744 704 40 0 5.38% 0.19% 1.78% 5.66% 0.42% 
2016 2 696 693 3 0 0.43% 0.01% 1.19% 1.47% 0.07% 
2016 3 744 740 4 0 0.54% 0.01% 0.98% 1.46% 0.09% 
2016 4 720 718 2 0 0.28% 0.00% 1.63% 1.80% 0.09% 
2016 5 744 678 2 64 0.27% 0.01% 3.71% 3.59% 11.86% 
2016 6 720 716 4 0 0.56% 0.01% 7.24% 7.57% 0.73% 
2016 7 744 740 4 0 0.54% 0.02% 9.61% 10.02% 1.20% 
2016 8 744 742 2 0 0.27% 0.01% 4.06% 4.24% 0.34% 
2016 9 720 650 28 42 3.89% 0.16% 11.88% 13.76% 33.73% 
2016 10 744 729 15 0 2.02% 0.06% 9.78% 11.00% 0.79% 
2016 11 720 699 21 0 2.92% 0.11% 4.49% 6.65% 0.43% 
2016 12 744 684 60 0 8.06% 0.41% 8.18% 13.46% 1.51% 
Table A10. Monthly historical dataset results for years 2013 to 2016 for all indices UFAPD–PWIIU 
(BritNed). 
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Appendix D: Methodological appendix: simulation 
We use a simulation-based methodology to derive the expected cross-border price 
differentials and flows between GB and both France and the Netherlands with an assumption 
of uncoupled markets. Our simulation assumes a cross-border market where, after the foreign 
price has been set, risk-averse traders are required to anticipate the GB price, and any 
anticipation errors would result in either an inefficient use of interconnectors or Flows Against 
Price Differences (FAPDs). We then compare the simulated price differentials and flows with 
actual data under market coupling to assess the impact of coupling on the cross-border 
electricity markets. The simulation model is based on Geske et al. (2018). 
Our analysis in this section only focuses on the day-ahead market, where the GB electricity 
market is fully coupled with France and the Netherlands. We use a simulation-based 
methodology to derive the expected cross-border price differentials and flows between GB 
and both France and the Netherlands in the case of uncoupled markets. Our simulation 
assumes a cross-border market where, after the French electricity price has been set, risk-
averse traders need to anticipate the GB electricity price, and any anticipation errors would 
result in either an inefficient use of interconnectors or Flows Against Price Differences 
(FAPDs). We then compare the simulated price differentials and flows with actual data under 
market coupling to assess the impact of coupling on the cross-border electricity markets. 
Before the 2014 day-ahead market coupling EU regulations came into force, the day-ahead 
(DA) market closed in France before it did in GB. This meant that traders had to predict GB 
prices, thereby facing uncertainty. Based on Geske et al. (2019), we assume that traders have 
a mean-variance utility function and, for simplicity, we assume the data is always collected 
from the import side (i.e. after accounting for transmission losses). We assume a single 
trader32 who maximises their utility function, 𝑈𝑈ℎ, at each hour, h  Max E(𝑈𝑈ℎ) = 𝑁𝑁�E�𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺� − 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹� − 𝜆𝜆2 (𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ ∗ 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝐷𝐷)2, 
where E(𝑈𝑈ℎ) is the expected utility of the trader, which is given by the difference between 
congestion revenue and a penalty term to evaluate the trader’s level of uncertainty; 𝑁𝑁 is GB’s 
net import from France in GW; 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 and 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  are the GB and French DA electricity prices, 
respectively, in €/MWh; 𝜆𝜆 is the trader’s discount factor towards price volatility; 𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′  is GB’s 
aggregated marginal cost function and 𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′  is the marginal value of electricity sales; and 
𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝐷𝐷 is the standard error of traders’ forecast of GB electricity demand.  
Given the above, the utility maximisation problem finds the optimal trading (net import for GB 
in GW) 𝑁𝑁� as:  
𝑁𝑁��E�𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�,𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹� =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ                  𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ ≤ 𝜃𝜃
𝜃𝜃                0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ0                E�𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺� = 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝜃𝜃             −𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 0
−𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ           𝜃𝜃 ≤ −𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ  
𝜃𝜃 = E�𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺� − 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2  
 
32 For simplicity, we assume there is only one trader who participates in day-ahead cross-border electricity trading. 
We assume that the trader can bid on a maximum volume equivalent to the net transfer capacity, then it is 
equivalent to assuming that there are 𝑛𝑛 equivalent traders in the market. 
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where 𝜃𝜃 denotes net import if there were no capacity constraint; and 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ denotes the net 
transfer capacity (NTC). The numerator of 𝜃𝜃  denotes the (expected) DA price differential 
between GB and France, while the denominator, despite the unknown function and 
parameters, can be regarded as a single parameter. Intuitively, a high expected price 
differential indicates greater potential for imports, therefore 𝜃𝜃 is positively correlated with the 
expected DA price differential.  
With forecast errors, 𝜃𝜃 can be expressed as 
𝜃𝜃 = 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + εℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 − 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2  
where εℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺~N(0,𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃2 ).  
We aim to estimate parameters 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 and 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃2  such that the simulated33 DA scheduled 
commercial exchange for IFA (and BritNed) in 2013 (when the markets are uncoupled) is 
reasonably close to the actual IFA (BritNed) day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange in 
2013, by comparing several commonly used metrics of trading inefficiency considered in this 
paper.  
Once the parameter values for IFA and BritNed have been identified, we can use these and 
the DA prices for both markets to simulate the uncoupled IFA and BritNed flows and price 
differentials during the examined electricity years (2014-2019), and then compare the resulting 
flow with the actual coupled flow and price differentials from the same period.  
We measure the degree of interconnector inefficiency before and after market coupling using 
the metrics PWIIU, UIUU, FAPD, WFAPD, and SCURED.  
Appendix E Results: value of market coupling 
3.1 Simulation results for IFA 
The measures of the inefficiency of the simulated flows (denoted as “Simulated flow I, II, III” 
with different values of parameters 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 and 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2) are reported in Table A11 and are 
compared with those of the actual uncoupled IFA flow in 2013, denoted as the “Actual DA 
flow”. 
Our results show that an increase in 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 would have positive impacts on all metrics 𝐼𝐼1 to 𝐼𝐼5, 
while an increase in 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 would further raise 𝐼𝐼3, 𝐼𝐼4, and 𝐼𝐼5, but have a lower impact on 
𝐼𝐼1 and 𝐼𝐼2. 
The metrics in Table A11 for “Simulated flow II” are all reasonably close to the metrics for the 
“Actual DA flow”, therefore we set 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 = 8 and 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 = 8  as the parameters of 
uncertainty for IFA without market coupling. 
Metric Actual day-ahead flow 
Simulated flow I Simulated flow II Simulated flow III 
𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 = 5, 
𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 = 4 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 =8, 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 = 8 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 =8, 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 = 4 
𝐼𝐼1 12.5% 9.7% 13.5% 14.3% 
𝐼𝐼2 1.7% 0.8% 1.4% 2.3% 
𝐼𝐼3 14.9% 8.2% 15.6% 7.0% 
 
33 Note that the day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange in 2013 and 2014 are from ENTSO-E, but the data for 
2015-2018 are from simulation as ENSTSO-E no longer provide this data since 2015. 
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𝐼𝐼4 21.9% 14.6% 22.8% 17.9% 
𝐼𝐼5 10.8% 3% 7.4% 4.9% 
Table A11. Day-ahead actual and simulated flows. 
We then simulate scenarios where trading over IFA occurs without market coupling during 
2014-2019 and compare them with the actual data based on market coupling, in terms of net 
imports into GB, congestion revenue, infra-marginal surplus, social surplus, and trading 
inefficiency.  
We first focus on the short-run effects and ignore the auto-regressive impact of electricity 
prices, as this will be considered and discussed as a long-run effect thereafter. The results 
are reported in Table A12.  
Among our main findings, based on annual averages, coupling caused the price differential 
between GB and France to fall by €0.40/MWh, net imports into GB to increase by 3.27 TWh 
(or by 34.4%), congestion Income increased by €23.4 million (or by 10.6%), and infra-marginal 
surplus increased by €3.8 million (or 1.7% of uncoupled congestion revenue). 
 Price Difference (€/MWh)  Net GB Imports (TWh) 
Electricity year Coupled Uncoupled ∆  Coupled Uncoupled ∆ 
2014-2015 15.83 16.34 -0.51  15.20 11.24 3.97 
2015-2016 18.76 19.11 -0.36  15.52 12.58 2.94 
2016-2017 8.54 8.80 -0.26  8.17 6.00 2.17 
2017-2018 10.49 10.88 -0.39  11.32 7.85 3.47 
2018-2019 13.76 14.22 -0.46  13.66 9.84 3.81 
Average 13.48 13.87 -0.40  12.77 9.50 3.27 
2016-2017 w/o 
CPS -0.45 -0.51 0.06 
 -0.13 0.00 0.13 
2017-2018 w/o 
CPS 2.59 2.43 0.16 
 0.54 1.73 1.19 
Average w/o CPS 1.07 0.96 0.11  0.20 0.87 0.66         
 Congestion Income (million €)  Infra-marginal Surplus (million €) 
2014-2015 256.84 233.73 23.11  17.17 13.34 3.83 
2015-2016 318.28 296.96 21.32  18.35 15.57 2.78 
2016-2017 197.33 176.79 20.54  12.48 9.30 3.19 
2017-2018 210.82 184.22 26.60  16.78 12.06 4.72 
2018-2019 234.06 208.62 25.44  16.81 12.35 4.46 
Average 243.47 220.06 23.40  16.32 12.52 3.80 
2016-2017 w/o 
CPS 154.34 130.25 24.09 
 12.11 7.48 4.63 
2017-2018 w/o 
CPS 150.91 121.60 29.30 
 15.88 9.45 6.43 
Average w/o CPS 152.62 125.93 26.69  13.99 8.46 5.53 
Table A12. Price differential (€/MWh), net GB Imports (TWh), congestion income (million €), and infra-marginal 
surplus (million €) for coupled and uncoupled trading over IFA, by year. 
We compare the inefficiency of the coupled and uncoupled markets using a range of trading 
inefficiency metrics, with results shown in Table A13. It is straightforward to see that market 
coupling reduced the inefficiency of cross-border trading. On average, during 2014-2019, the 
share of FAPDs fell from 13.3% to a negligible 2.8%, and the Weighted FAPDs (WFAPDs) 
from 1.5% to only 0.1%. PWIIU, UIIU, and SCURED also considerably decreased.  
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Electricity year Market condition 
Metrics  
UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2014-2015 
Coupled 7.6% 0.3% 1.2% 7.5% 0.5% 
Uncoupled 12.2% 1.2% 17.0% 23.3% 10.1% 
2015-2016 
Coupled 5.0% 0.1% 1.0% 5.1% 0.3% 
Uncoupled 8.8% 0.6% 13.4% 18.6% 7.6% 
2016-2017 
Coupled 0.7% 0.0% 8.7% 10.9% 1.2% 
Uncoupled 15.2% 1.8% 20.1% 27.4% 10.5% 
2017-2018 
Coupled 0.2% 0.0% 7.4% 8.2% 1.2% 
Uncoupled 14.9% 2.0% 22.9% 29.4% 13.9% 
2018-2019 
Coupled 0.4% 0.0% 7.4% 8.8% 0.8% 
Uncoupled 13.2% 1.6% 22.1% 27.5% 11.7% 
Average 2014-2019 
Coupled 2.8% 0.1% 5.1% 8.1% 0.8% 
Uncoupled 12.9% 1.5% 19.1% 25.2% 10.8%        
2016-2017 w/o CPS 
Coupled 3.1% 0.1% 4.7% 10.9% 1.3% 
Uncoupled 17.9% 3.1% 26.8% 32.0% 13.9% 
2017-2018 w/o CPS 
Coupled 5.3% 0.2% 4.5% 14.8% 2.3% 
Uncoupled 21.8% 4.1% 30.3% 38.7% 20.9% 
Table A13. IFA trading inefficiency with and without market coupling, by year. Key: I1, I2, I3, I4, I5 are UFAPD (or 
FAPD), WFAPD, SCURED, UIIU, and PWIIU, respectively. 
We also simulated the cases where the GB Carbon Price Support (CPS) is removed, finding 
that when GB and French day-ahead prices are reasonably close (in 2016-2018), and when 
markets are uncoupled, all metrics of inefficiency would be significantly higher than the cases 
where the CPS has been implemented and the GB price is much greater than the French price. 
This is because when prices are closer, it is much more difficult to accurately forecast the sign 
of a price differential between two markets, hence the direction of flows, resulting in greater 
trading inefficiency. 
The impact of market coupling was also tested by relaxing the assumption of a British CPS 
and comparing differences between the coupled and uncoupled market. Average differences 
in price differential (€/MWh), net imports (TWh), congestion income (million €), and infra-
marginal surplus (million €) for coupled and uncoupled trading over IFA between 2016-2018, 
are reported in the last three rows of Table A12. By removing the CPS, GB prices in 2015-
2017 would have been reasonably close to the French price, and so the net imports are close 
to zero (although this is made up of considerable imports and exports, hence the substantial 
congestion income). Without the CPS, the impact of uncoupling on congestion income and 
infra-marginal surplus are slightly higher (by €3.3 million/yr and €1.7m./yr respectively) than 
in cases with the CPS. 
3.2 Simulation results for BritNed 
BritNed has an interconnector capacity of 1 GW, or half the 2 GW of IFA. Therefore, the 
change in flows due to market coupling (or uncoupling) may have lower impacts on the BritNed 
price differential, net imports, and private and social benefit, compared to IFA. As performed 
for the case of IFA, we begin by comparing the simulated 2013 BritNed DA scheduled 
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commercial exchange with the actual value (from ENTSO-E34), with results shown in Table 
A14.  
Metric Actual day-ahead flow 
Simulated flow I Simulated flow II Simulated flow III 
𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 = 6, 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 =4 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 =7, 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 =8 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 =8, 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 =8 
𝐼𝐼1 19.3% 22.0% 22.4% 24.8% 
𝐼𝐼2 6.2% 7.5% 6.5% 8.4% 
𝐼𝐼3 16.8% 8.3% 16.8% 16.6% 
𝐼𝐼4 30.6% 27.1% 31.8% 33.8% 
𝐼𝐼5 20.1% 12.8% 16.4% 18.6% 
Table A14. Day-ahead actual and simulated flows for BritNed. 
“Simulated flow II” is reasonably close to the “actual day-ahead flow”. We therefore assume 
the values for parameters to simulate the uncoupled BritNed flow during 2015-201835 is 
𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃 = 7 and 𝜆𝜆(𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎)2 = 8.  
We then assess the impact of market coupling on BritNed, with results shown in Table A15. 
Similarly to IFA, market coupling facilitates price convergence, raises congestion revenue and 
infra-marginal surplus. GB also imports more thanks to market coupling because the GB price 
is almost always higher than the Dutch price during the period 2015-2018.  
On average, market coupling reduced the price differential between GB and the Netherlands  
by €0.28/MWh (by 1.8%), increased net imports into GB by 1.03 TWh/yr (by 14.9%), raised 
congestion income  by €6.7 m/yr (by 5.4%), and boosted infra-marginal surplus by €1.8 m/yr 
(by 1.4% of uncoupled congestion revenue). The impact of market coupling on BritNed is 
smaller than that on IFA. This is not only because of BritNed’s lower capacity, but also because 
the price differential between GB and the Netherlands is much larger than that between GB 
and France, meaning there is less uncertainty on the sign of the GB-NL price differential. 
Uncoupling would therefore result in a lower share of FAPDs and an increase in congestion 
income and infra-marginal surplus.  
Similarly to IFA, the removal of asymmetric carbon taxes would result in spot price 
convergence between GB and the Netherlands. As a result, uncoupling the interconnector 
would have higher impact on both congestion income and infra-marginal surplus. 
 
 Price Difference (€/MWh)  Net Import (TWh) 
Electricity year Coupled Uncoupled ∆  Coupled Uncoupled ∆ 
2015-2016 17.00 17.23 -0.23  8.27 7.42 0.85 
2016-2017 15.78 16.08 -0.29  7.85 6.73 1.12 
2017-2018 12.82 13.13 -0.31  7.71 6.58 1.13 
Average 15.20 15.48 -0.28  7.94 6.91 1.03 
2016-2017 w/o CPS 9.60 9.52 0.08  4.26 4.12 0.13 
2017-2018 w/o CPS 7.36 7.21 0.16  3.68 3.88 -0.20 
        
 Congestion Income (million €)  Infra-marginal Surplus (million €) 
Electricity year Coupled Uncoupled ∆  Coupled Uncoupled ∆ 
 
34 For BritNed, ENTSO-E only provides the day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange before 2015, or after 2018. 
35 As there is no freely available public data for the BritNed day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange, we use 
the simulated data from Guo et al. (2019).  
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2015-2016 148.02 142.91 5.10  11.65 10.30 1.34 
2016-2017 137.10 129.44 7.65  11.17 9.25 1.92 
2017-2018 112.62 105.06 7.56  10.73 8.67 2.06 
Average 132.58 125.81 6.77  11.18 9.41 1.77 
2016-2017 w/o CPS 87.76 77.52 10.25  9.23 5.72 3.51 
2017-2018 w/o CPS 68.89 59.44 9.45  8.53 4.92 3.61 
Table A15. Price differential (€/MWh), net GB Imports (TWh), congestion income (million €), and infra-marginal 
surplus (million €) for coupled and uncoupled trading over BritNed, by year. 
Table A16 compares trading inefficiency for BritNed, with and without market coupling, for 
electricity years 2015-2018. Again, uncoupling increases trading inefficiency. UFAPD 
(WFAPD) increased from 3% (0.1%) to 10.8% (1.7%), while SCURED, UIUU, and PWIIU also 
show substantial increases.  
It is also worth mentioning that the metrics (I1-5) shown in Table A16 based on uncoupled 
markets during 2015-2018 are smaller than the metrics in 2013 (Table A11), where BritNed 
was also uncoupled. This is because in 2013, the average GB-NL price differential is 
€7.11/MWh, which was much lower than in 2015-2018, shown in Table A16 (on average 
€15.2/MWh under market coupling). This confirms our earlier finding where if prices are closer, 
uncoupling would have a more negative impact on trading inefficiency.  
 
Electricity 
Years 
Market 
Condition 
Metrics 
UFAPD WFAPD SCURED UIIU PWIIU 
2015-2016 
Coupled 4.4% 0.2% 3.1% 7.6% 1.9% 
Uncoupled 8.4% 1.1% 5.7% 13.0% 5.2% 
2016-2017 
Coupled 2.5% 0.1% 6.6% 9.4% 5.2% 
Uncoupled 11.2% 1.8% 8.9% 17.8% 10.0% 
2017-2018 
Coupled 2.2% 0.1% 9.0% 11.6% 3.0% 
Uncoupled 12.7% 2.3% 10.1% 20.0% 8.9% 
Average 2015-2018 
Coupled 3.0% 0.1% 6.2% 9.5% 3.4% 
Uncoupled 10.8% 1.7% 8.2% 16.9% 8.0% 
2016-2017 w/o CPS 
Coupled 0.9% 0.0% 8.9% 22.3% 10.3% 
Uncoupled 20.4% 5.1% 16.1% 29.9% 17.9% 
2017-2018 w/o CPS 
Coupled 1.3% 0.0% 10.8% 26.0% 8.7% 
Uncoupled 21.9% 6.8% 16.8% 31.6% 17.2% 
Table A16. BritNed trading inefficiency with and without market coupling, by year. Key: I1, I2, I3, I4, I5 are UFAPD (or 
FAPD), WFAPD, SCURED, UIIU, and PWIIU, respectively. 
Without carbon tax asymmetries, the electricity prices between GB and the Netherlands would 
further converge. As a result, the impact of market uncoupling would be severe, resulting in 
much higher inefficiency.  
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Appendix F: additional information 
3.1 Estimating welfare gains 
Two approaches have been used to estimate welfare gains. For historic interconnector 
performance, a series of metrics examining different aspects of welfare and trading efficiency 
have been developed, which are functions of market prices and interconnector flows (e.g. 
ACER, 2012; EU Commission, 2010-Q3). Since this approach cannot be used to estimate 
future welfare gains from interconnectors, the second approach is to use complex electricity 
system models to generate scenarios of flows and prices (e.g. Pöyry, 2012; Redpoint, 2013; 
ENTSO-E, 2014; EU Commission, 2015; and Aurora, 2016). Assumptions about the 
underlying electricity system vary widely between studies. Moreover, most models assume 
coupled markets, perfect foresight, and day-ahead plant dispatch, so account for neither 
demand uncertainty, trader behaviour, nor intra-day and balancing markets. 
3.2 Trading in uncoupled and coupled markets 
3.2.1 Trading in uncoupled markets 
In uncoupled markets, traders must separately buy electricity in one market, sell in another 
market, and buy and nominate interconnector capacity from the first market to the second 
market. Efficient day-ahead nominations require traders to accurately predict the magnitude 
and direction of the day-ahead auction price differentials. In practice, this can be quite 
challenging, and prior to market coupling, day-ahead scheduled flow was frequently 
suboptimal, or even in the wrong direction (ACER, 2012). 
Where day-ahead scheduled flow proves economically suboptimal, it is possible for traders to 
correct it in the intra-day markets. This requires them to buy and nominate intra-day capacity, 
and either to buy and sell in the different markets, or to accept exposure to the balancing 
mechanism. In practice, there are generally limited liquidity and significant transaction costs 
in intra-day markets, and a general reluctance to expose to volatile prices in the balancing 
mechanism.36   As a result, interconnector flow will often only be adjusted in the intra-day 
market where there is a large enough movement in the price differential, or for operational 
reasons such as an unexpected change in generation or demand. 
3.2.2 Trading in coupled markets 
Day-ahead coupling obviates the need to predict day-ahead price differentials. Instead, they 
can release it to the interconnector operator for optimised settlement based on the day-ahead 
auction process. The EUPHEMIA algorithm will ensure that flow is optimised, based on bids 
and offers in the two markets and interconnector constraints. The interconnector may be 
constrained, in which case there is a price differential between the two markets, and capacity 
holders receive a financial settlement based on the price differential (adjusted for any losses 
applied by the interconnector operator). Alternatively, the interconnector may be 
unconstrained, in which case no settlement is made. 
As a result of this ability to release interconnector capacity for optimised settlement based on 
the day-ahead auction, traders are less likely to manually nominate their interconnector 
capacity. Even if the interconnector capacity is being held as a hedge for offsetting physical 
 
36 The SEM Committee (2019) found 92% of trades took place in or prior to the day-ahead market. The remaining 
8% of trades took place in declining quantities in the three intraday and continuous markets, falling from 4% in the 
first intraday market to less than 0.5% in the continuous market. 
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positions in the two markets, it may still make sense for the capacity and the two physical 
positions to be closed out financially in the day-ahead market. 
3.3 Price-based metrics and flow-based metrics 
3.3.1 Price-based metrics 
Interconnectors promote price convergence as traders buy and sell electricity until prices 
equalise. This concept is known as arbitrage and while it can provide useful indications about 
the potential gains from trade, it does not indicate whether the underlying transmission 
capacity has been used inefficiently. Coupling markets and increasing interconnection 
capacity can increase price convergence (Zachmann, 2008). Price convergence can be 
measured by simply inspecting the mean (or median) price differential between zones. 
Price differentials. In 2017, price convergence varied greatly across Europe. The average 
absolute day-ahead price differential ranged from less than 0.5 €/MWh on the borders 
between Estonia and Finland, Portugal and Spain, and between Latvia and Lithuania, to more 
than 10 €/MWh on several other borders, such as those between the 
Germany/Austria/Luxembourg bidding zone and five of its neighbouring countries, and on all 
British borders (likely due to GB’s Carbon Price Floor). Large price differentials indicate that 
increasing cross-zonal interconnection capacity, especially on borders with the highest price 
differentials, would reduce overall electricity system costs (ACER, 2015; 2017). In the absence 
of interconnection transmission limits, one would expect prices in all zones to converge in a 
competitive single market (Castagneto Gissey et al., 2014). 
Various econometric methods have been used to analyse price differentials, in the form of 
electricity spot price convergence (De Vany and Walls, 1999; Robinson, 2007; Zachmann, 
2008). Using principal component analysis, Zachmann (2008) rejects the overall market 
integration hypothesis except for certain pairs of European markets. Robinson (2007) employs 
B-convergence and co-integration tests, suggesting that convergence occurred for most 
European markets. Bunn and Gianfreda (2010) showed increased market integration for 
France, UK, Netherlands, Germany, and Spain. Integration was found not to increase with 
geographical proximity but with capacity of the interconnector. Kalantzis and Milonas (2010) 
found both interconnection and geographical distance playing a critical role in price dispersion. 
Based on correlation and co-integration analyses, Boisseleau (2004) did not detect 
convergence among wholesale prices. Armstrong and Galli (2005) found convergence among 
wholesale price differentials in France, Germany, Netherlands and Spain, from 2002 to 2004. 
Using fractional co-integration analysis, Houllier and de Menezes (2013) showed long memory 
for price shocks and co-integration to be present only for a few markets, including Germany, 
France and Netherlands. These studies considered integration between pairs of prices, whilst 
Castagneto Gissey et al. (2014) accounted for a whole system of prices, finding integration to 
be low but increasing over time and reflecting regulatory integration. 
3.3.2 Flow-based metrics 
Some flow-based metrics indirectly measure trading inefficiency. As they do not consider 
prices, they are unable to indicate whether trades occurred inefficiently, since inefficient trades 
involve electricity flows that increase overall generation cost. 
Indexed annual aggregation of hourly NTC values. These are changes in cross-zonal Net 
Transfer Capacity (NTC) offered to the market for trade are analysed by ACER (2012) for the 
period 2008–2012, representing a very simple measure of interconnector use. They estimate 
it for 23 EU borders, finding a 9% increase to be a ‘modest [but] positive trend’. Despite this, 
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the recorded values are meaningful only if extra capacities are not utilised inefficiently, so the 
measure fails to directly consider the inefficiency of interconnector use.37 
Capacity utilisation ratio.38 This is measured as the ratio of the number of hours when intra-
day capacity was used to the number of hours when intra-day capacity was available. ACER 
(2012) compared this measure to that in the day-ahead timeframe, concluding that intra-day 
capacity utilisation was relatively low. 39  In addition, the authors concluded that implicit 
allocation was less inefficient than explicit (or other) allocation methods.40 
Absolute sum of net nominations per year. This measure indicates the level of available 
cross-zonal intra-day market capacity and is considered by ACER (2018). They show that, in 
absolute terms, aggregated cross-zonal allocations nominated across the European network 
tripled between 2010 and 2017. While this metric is useful to understand the level of capacity 
nominated on the interconnector, it does not indicate whether this capacity is used inefficiently 
since it does not involve prices. 
3.4 Measures of social welfare 
Interconnectors are expected to increase welfare by reducing overall costs across the two 
electricity systems, through creating consumer surplus to importers and producer surplus to 
exporters. Since social welfare is challenging to calculate, the metrics presented in the paper 
are used instead to estimate interconnector use efficiency as a proxy for maximising social 
welfare. However, some studies have calculated social welfare metrics directly, particularly for 
examining the potential impacts of deploying new interconnectors. 
Models are used to estimate the change in social welfare due to adding an interconnector to 
connect two systems. For example, the UK electricity regulator, Ofgem, analysed welfare 
changes by estimating the consumer and producer surplus 41  changes for the proposed 
ElecLink interconnector between Great Britain and France. 42  This requires an electricity 
system model to examine the counterfactual situation in which the interconnector has/has not 
been deployed (depending on whether the study is taking place before or after deployment). 
Since models include numerous assumptions and simplifications compared with real markets 
(see Appendix 6.4, SI), it is difficult to compare studies. 
Social welfare may include all external costs of CO2 emissions and other pollutants, as well 
as, ideally, correcting for market power. Mansur and White (2012) consider the impacts of 
moving from bilateral trading to simultaneous market dispatch and clearing. By comparing 
monthly prices before and after a bilaterally cleared zone joined the Pennsylvania-Jersey-
Maryland (PJM) nodally-priced market area, they estimated reductions in price differentials 
and welfare gains, finding potential incremental gains of $3.6m/GW. Ott (2010) used a similar 
approach and found that the total benefit of efficiently pricing PJM was $2.2bn/yr. De Jong et 
al. (2007) simulated four EU countries, finding welfare effects of flow-based market coupling 
at about €200m/yr. Meeus (2011) studied historical data relating to the 600 MW Kontek cable 
linking Denmark to Germany over various coupling initiatives and found imperfect coupling 
with 5% UFAPDs even after coupling took place, with welfare gains of €10m/yr. The SEM 
 
37 See ACER (2012), Section 3.2.2. 
38 These are considered for price differentials greater than €1/MWh, which are viewed as significant by ACER 
(2016, 2017). 
39 For 2017, 50% utilisation rate in intra-day vs 86% utilisation rate in day-ahead. 
40 See ACER (2012), Section 5.2. 
41 Consumer surplus is the difference between the highest price a retailer is willing to pay and the actual market 
price of electricity. Producer surplus is the difference between the electricity market price and the lowest price a 
generator would be willing to accept. 
42https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/84685/appendix2-londoneconomicseleclinkreviewsummary.pdf 
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Committee (2011) estimated the social costs of not coupling the two interconnectors between 
Great Britain and the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of Ireland for 2010. The 
estimated social welfare gains from coupling were €30m/yr based on an average import 
capacity of 930 MW, or €32m/GWyr.  
The relatively modest welfare and efficiency benefits in these studies may be underestimated 
because the models are too simplistic to account for all of the transmission failures that 
coupling may relieve, and because they are calibrated based on previous generation portfolios 
with lower renewable generation (and so less congestion) than seen at present (Newbery et 
al., 2016). National Grid (2015) estimated that sharing reserves over interconnectors could 
reduce capacity needs by nearly 3 GW, which could be worth €15m/GWyr. These findings led 
to regulators requiring coupling of electricity markets in Europe, until 85% of the European 
power consumption was coupled in 2015 (Geske et al., 2018).  
 
 
